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Abstract
Information, rumors, debates shape and reinforce the percep-
tion of reality and heavily impact public opinion. Indeed, the
way in which individuals influence each other is one of the
foundational challenges in several disciplines such as soci-
ology, social psychology, and economics. One of the most
fascinating and powerful mechanisms of social contagion is
that of group polarization. The phenomenon manifests when
like-minded people discuss and reinforce their shared views
thus ending up in a more extreme position. The core of the re-
search work presented in this thesis explores the phenomenon
of group polarization on online social media. We focus on
the Italian and US pages providing scientific and conspir-
acy information and we analyze a) users’ emotional dynam-
ics and b) their response to dissenting information. We offer
tight quantitative evidence about the existence of echo cham-
bers on online social media. Users tend to promote their be-
liefs and to form highly polarized groups. Furthermore, deal-
ing with untrusted opponents in online discussion results for
users in a major commitment with respect to their own echo
chamber.
xiv
CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Information, rumors, debates shape and reinforce the perception of re-
ality and heavily impact public opinion. The way in which individu-
als influence each other, indeed, is one of the foundational challenges in
several disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, and economics.
One of the most fascinating and powerful mechanisms of social conta-
gion is that of group polarization. The phenomenon manifests when like-
minded people discuss and reinforce their shared views thus ending up
in a more extreme position. The core of the research work presented in
this thesis explores, by means of quantitative methods, the phenomenon
of group polarization on online social media.
Global communications have been extremely facilitated by the rapid
advance of the Internet and web technologies; digital interactions allow
news and information to spread all over the world rapidly and inten-
sively. These changes have dramatically influenced the way information
get consumed, leading up to the formation of a scenario where few sup-
pliers provide fact-checked information (e.g., publishers, news organisa-
tions, the academy). In turn, a heterogeneous mass of alternative infor-
mation sources emerged, fostered by the active participation of people in
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the production and diffusion of contents.
Such a large diversification of information deeply affects the mech-
anisms behind the formation of public opinion (1; 2; 3); the active role
played by people determined the emergence of new knowledge, enthu-
siastically dubbed as collective intelligence (4; 5; 6; 7). Nevertheless, social
media are pervaded by the presence of unsubstantiated or untruthful ru-
mours resulting in a sort of collective credulity. As stated in (8), people are
misinformed when they confidently hold wrong beliefs. Indeed, misin-
formation might negatively influence the public opinion.
The empirical investigations conducted in (8) show that, in general,
people tend to resist facts, holding inaccurate factual beliefs confidently.
Indeed, in 2013 WEF placed the global risk of massive digital misinfor-
mation at the core of technological and geopolitical risks ranging from
terrorism to cyber attacks and the failure of global governance (9). More-
over, results in (10) also indicate that corrections frequently fail to reduce
misperceptions; on the contrary, in several cases they act as a backfire ef-
fect, actually increasing misperceptions among the considered group.
Thus, beyond its great benefits, a hyperconnected world might allow
the viral spread (i.e., a rapid and wide diffusion of a piece of information
among Internet users) of misleading or provocative information, that
could result in serious real-word consequences. Indeed, such a scenario
represents a florid environment for digital wildfires – i.e, viral phenom-
ena triggered by false or sensitive information online – when combined
with both functional illiteracy and confirmation bias – i.e., the tendency to
search, select, and interpret information coherently with one’s system of
beliefs.
For instance, it has been reported that inadequate health policies in
South Africa led to more than 300,000 unnecessary AIDS deaths (11);
however, these tragic events has been exacerbated by AIDS denialists,
who state that HIV is inoffensive and that antiretroviral drugs cause,
rather than treat, AIDS. In fact, several works pointed out the dangers
of denying AIDS (12; 13); as Kalichman asserts, AIDS denialism is the out-
right rejection of science and medicine [and] has emerged as a genuine menace to
global public health including in the United States and, particularly, in South
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Africa. Similar considerations could be extended to the recent Ebola out-
break in west Africa. After the death of two people having drunk salt
water, the World Health Organisation (WHO) restated that all rumours
about hypothetical cures or practices are false and that their use can be
dangerous (14). More recently, we have witnessed the American case of
Jade Helm 15, a military training exercise which took place in multiple
US states. The drill turned out to be perceived as a conspiracy plot aim-
ing at imposing martial law, to the extent that the Texas Gov. Greg Abbott
ordered the State Guard to monitor the operations.
Consequently, several concerns have been expressed about social in-
fluence on the Internet. As an example, Donald Trump is the Republican
Party nominee in the 2016 US presidential election, against all odds. His
strategic social media campaign is still a matter of speculation, and many
hypothesis have been put forward about the reasons behind its success
and the impact on the electoral process. Similar doubts have been raised
during the Brexit – the British referendum to leave the European Union
– campaign, where both sides, Leave and Remain, battled it out on social
media. Indeed, on the Internet people can access more and more ex-
treme versions of their own judgements. In this way the benefits coming
from exposure to different points of view can be dramatically reduced
(15). Individuals, and the groups that they form, may move to a more
extreme point in the same direction indicated by their own preexisting
beliefs; when people discuss with many like-minded others, their views
become more extreme (16). This phenomenon is known as group polariza-
tion and is directly connected to concerns about the consequences of the
Internet, which allows for a relative anonymity and may intensify group
polarization (17). Indeed, social influence is one of the main mechanisms
underlying group polarization and may affect an individual’s behavior
in two different ways, 1) informational and 2) reputational (18; 19). In the
first case, what other (relevant) people do or say carries an informational
externality (20) and observers are willing to follow them. In the second
case, observers may do what they believe other people think they should
do, just because they care about their reputation.
A very famous experiment about group influences was conducted by
3
Figure 1: A replication of the cards used during the Asch experiment. The
card on the left is for reference, the one on the right shows the comparison
lines.
Solomon Asch in 1955 (21). The task of the subjects was very simple:
they had to match a certain line placed on a white card with the corre-
sponding one – i.e., having the same length – among three other lines
placed on another white card. A replication of the cards is shown in
Fig. 1. The subject was one of the eight people taking part to the test,
but was unaware that the others were there as part of the research. The
experiment consisted of three different rounds. In the first two rounds
everyone provided the right (and quite obvious) answer. In the third
round some group members matched the reference line to the shorter or
longer one on the second card, introducing the so-called unexpected dis-
turbance (22). In this case the subject could decide to keep his decision
unchanged or yield to the others. Normally subjects erred less than 1%
of the time; but in these rounds they erred 36.8% of the time (23). The
experiment showed that, under group pressure, individuals were highly
likely to abandon the direct evidence of their own senses. Both informa-
tional and reputational considerations appear to have led people toward
these errors (16).
Another relevant study was conducted by James Stoner, who iden-
tified the so-called risky shift (24). In the experiment people were first
asked to study twelve different problems and provide their personal
judgement; after that, they had to join as a group and take a final decision
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together. Out of thirteen groups, twelve repeatedly showed a pattern to-
wards greater risk-taking. While 45% did not change their judgements
at all, only 16% were moved in the direction of greater caution and 39%
in that of greater risk-taking. This shift is the above-named risky shift.
Hence, group discussion may enhance the initial tendency of indi-
vidual group members and fosters polarization. In general, two main
explanations may be listed for group polarization: social comparison and
persuasive arguments. In the first case, people want to be perceived fa-
vorably both by other group members and by themselves; consequently,
they adjust their judgement towards the dominant position. In the sec-
ond case, the individual’s choice shifts in the direction of the most per-
suasive position presented within the group. Therefore, when a group
is formed by members who are already inclined in a certain direction,
the majority of the arguments supports the same direction. As a result,
the decision is likely to move individuals further in the direction of their
initial judgements.
1.2 Advances
This thesis aims at studying quantitatively the phenomenon of group po-
larization on online social media. The emerging field of computational
social science (CSS) (25; 26) benefits from the large availability of data
from online social networks. Indeed, social scientists were limited until
now to surveys (that are backdated) and lab experiments, that are usu-
ally performed on a relatively small group of people and deeply affected
by external validity issues. In (27) authors argued that both sample sur-
veys and in-depth interviews are dated research methods by now. CSS,
instead, leverages the capacity to collect and analyze data at unprece-
dented scales and levels of details and may allow to discover patterns of
individual and group behaviours.
However, a series of challenges has to be considered, as pointed out
by Marc Huberty in (28). First, we can not claim that our data allow a
clear and unbiased study of humanity; most of the data comes from ser-
vices such as web pages, online shopping or social media, the so-called
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digital exhaust (29), which does not concern the society in general. There-
fore, the uses of such data are limited. Second, we can not assert that
understanding online behaviour today implies that we will be able to
do the same tomorrow. Third, even if online and offline identity are
not completely separate, researchers have shown that individuals’ on-
line identities vary from their offline selves largely; hence, we can not
state that online behaviour coincides with offline behaviour. Finally, we
can not assume that complex patterns of social behaviour today will still
describe the world that we would like to predict tomorrow.
Nevertheless, the development of tools for understanding and ana-
lyzing social dynamics on the web takes on great importance and in-
volves a cross-methodological approach to formulate and validate data-
driven models. Recent works such as (30; 31; 32; 33) focused on structural
properties of the network to determine the way in which news spread in
social networks, what makes messages go viral and what are the charac-
teristics of users who help spread such information. Snopes.com (34),
launched as a purely urban-legends site in 1995, is considered one of the
most reliable resources for sifting through political and media facts and
fallacies, especially since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. In 2014 journalist
Craig Silverman also launched Emergent.info (35), a website aiming
at containing the viral spread of unsubstantiated news by monitoring
web contents in real time. Nonetheless, both of them do not take into
consideration two significant factors: first, people who are not interested
in knowing the truth about a certain topic will probably consider its de-
nial as a further attempt to control information; second, the system does
not consider the complexity of some information and the essential role
played by socio-cognitive factors in this kind of mechanisms.
Here we present a collection of works that address the phenomenon
of group polarization on Facebook. Focusing on the Italian and US pages
providing scientific and conspiracy information we analyse a) users’ emo-
tional dynamics and b) their response to dissenting information. The
main results of the thesis may be summarized as follows:
1. By means of sentiment analysis techniques, we show that users
committed to the same narrative tend to negatively influence each
6
other. Such an emotional influence is even more negative when
opposite factions of users meet and discuss.
2. The tendency of users to join polarized groups sharing the same
narrative creates a segregation effect and dissenting information is
mainly ignored.
We offer tight quantitative evidence about the existence of echo cham-
bers on online social media. Users tend to promote their beliefs and form
highly polarized groups. Furthermore, dealing with untrusted oppo-
nents in online discussion results for users in a major commitment with
respect to their own echo chamber. As an example, by examining the
response of users to debunking efforts, we find that these attempts are
largely ineffective and only serve to reinforce people’s preexisting beliefs
(36).
The thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter 2 an overview of the
state-of-the-art is provided, especially focusing on information diffusion,
emotional contagion, and rumors spreading; in Chapters 3 and 4 main
research works are discussed; in Chapter 5 conclusions are drawn and
future works are sketched; finally, in Appendix A secondary works are
briefly presented, while details about Facebook datasets are given in Ap-
pendix B.
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CHAPTER
TWO
STATE-OF-THE-ART
2.1 Social, Emotional, and Informational Con-
tagion
In 2009 a paper on Science (26) proclaims the birth of the Computational
Social Science (CSS), an emerging research field aiming at studying mas-
sive social phenomena quantitatively by means of a multidisciplinary ap-
proach based on Computer Science, Statistics, and Social Sciences. In (25)
the author stresses the importance to conduct studies aiming at under-
standing the structure of networks and how information spreads across
them. Since CSS benefits from the large availability of data from online
social networks, it is attracting researchers in ever-increasing numbers
as it allows for the study of mass social dynamics at an unprecedented
level of resolution. Along this path, recent studies have pointed out sev-
eral important results ranging from social contagion (37; 38; 39) up to in-
formation diffusion (40; 41), passing through the virality of false claims
(30; 31). A wide literature branch is also devoted to understanding the
spread of rumors and behaviors focusing on structural properties of so-
cial networks (30; 31; 39; 42) .
In (42) Damon Centola investigates the effects of topology on diffu-
sion showing that network structure has a significant effect. Moreover,
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he observes that the behavior spread farther and faster across clustered-
lattice networks than across corresponding random networks. In (39) au-
thors use data of about 900M users on Facebook and analyze the process
of contagion in the social network. They found that the probability of
contagion is tightly controlled by the number of connected components
in an individual’s contact neighbourhood, rather than by the actual size
of the neighbourhood. Thus, the chance of a user to adopt a new idea
does not depend on the number of friends already holding it, but on the
number of different social groups those friends hold membership in. In
other words, the spread of ideas does not depend on the number of peo-
ple, but on the variety of people holding them.
A key factor in identifying true contagion in social network is to dis-
tinguish between peer-to-peer influence and homophily: in the first case,
a node influences or causes outcomes in its neighbours, while in the sec-
ond one dyadic similarities between nodes create correlated outcome
patterns among neighbours that merely mimic viral contagions with-
out direct causal influence (38). In (37) authors developed an estima-
tion framework to distinguish influence and homophily effects in dy-
namic networks and found that homophily explains more than 50% of
the perceived behavioral contagion. These results become crucial for un-
derstanding the mechanisms behind contagions in networks and how to
propagate or combat them.
Furthermore, another family of phenomena is represented by the emo-
tional contagion, which may manifest responses that are either similar
(e.g., when smiles elicit smiles) or complementary (e.g., when a fist raised
in anger causes fear) (43); emotional states may be transferred to oth-
ers, letting people experience the same emotions without realising it. In
particular, results presented in (44) indicate that emotions expressed by
others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimen-
tal evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks. In (45) au-
thors analyze Twitter data and measure the spatio-temporal sentiment
towards a new vaccine, finding a strong correlation between sentiments
expressed online and vaccination rates by region. Moreover, they show
that information flows more often between users who share the same
9
sentiment. Several studies have also tried to measure the effects of so-
cial influence online (42; 46; 47; 48). In a report on Science (49) Aral
and Walker show that the propagation of behaviors of 1.3M of Facebook
users is determined by the joint combinations of influence, susceptibil-
ity, and spontaneous adoption. Indeed, influential individuals are less
susceptible to influence than noninfluential individuals, which suggests
that influential individuals with influential friends could be crucial for
the spread of information on online social networks. In a 61M Facebook
users experiment during the 2010 US congressional elections (50), au-
thors show that political mobilization messages directly influenced the
voting behavior of people, as well as their political self-expression and
information seeking.
Discovering and sharing information on online social networks may
lead to the formation of cascades of reshares between users and thus
reach a large number of individuals. A growing branch of literature fo-
cused on analyzing and characterizing such cascades, so as to discover
the driving forces behind the popularity of contents. Cascades have been
largely explored in different settings, such as blogging (40; 51; 52), e-
mails (53; 54) and social sites e.g., Twitter (41; 55). Recent works (30; 31)
also consider the anatomy and predictivity of large Facebook cascades,
showing that rumor cascades run deeper in the social network than re-
share cascades in general (32). Many other papers focus on the prediction
of the popularity of a certain piece of content and propose rich sets of fea-
tures, varying from the content, to the poster/resharer features, up to the
structure and temporal properties of the cascade. In parallel, a more cau-
tious train of thought stresses the rarity of cascades (56) and argues that
their future trajectory may be unpredictable (48; 57).
Nonetheless, network structure is often not enough to understand
certain dynamics. In (58) authors analyze the behavior of a large move-
ment on Facebook. In March of 2013 3M users changed their profile pic-
ture to one of an equal sign to express their support of same-sex mar-
riage. Authors find that, even if the number of friends played a role in
the adoption of the new picture, the same did demographic and indi-
vidual characteristics. Moreover, it has to be considered that someone
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having many friends who have changed their profile pictures is likely
to be the kind of person who would join the movement, as social links
are mainly created by homophily. Indeed, authors point out the impor-
tance to distinguish between influence and susceptibility in this kind of
diffusion processes.
The role of social networks in information diffusion has been largely
explored. In (59) researchers study 253M users on Facebook, finding that
those exposed are more likely to spread information, and do so more
rapidly. Furthermore, they show that it is the abundance of weak ties –
i.e., people in one’s extended network – that is responsible for the propa-
gation of novel information.
2.2 Echo Chambers and Misinformation
The ever-increasing number of people resorting to online social networks
for news and information raises important issues with respect to the
creation of the so-called echo chambers, an enclosed system where users
are exposed only to information from people having similar opinions
(60). On the other hand, many argue that the formation of filter bubbles –
where only ideologically appealing information is available – is directly
related to the algorithms used to rank contents (61). Speaking of this, in
(62) Facebook research scientists quantify exactly how much individuals
could be exposed to ideologically diverse news and information in social
media. In particular, they analyze the interaction of 10.1M users with
socially shared news, finding that individual’s choice about what to con-
sume has an effect stronger than that of Facebook’s News Feed algorithm
in limiting the exposure to cross-cutting content.
Undoubtedly, the selective exposure to specific content facilitates the
aggregation of users in echo chambers, wherein external and contradict-
ing versions are ignored (63). Such a contest is crucial for the spread of
unsubstantiated rumors; indeed, the main driver for the popularity of
unverified contents becomes the confirmation bias – i.e., the tendency to
search and interpret information in a way that it is coherent with one’s
beliefs or convinctions (64).
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In addition, the massive diffusion of socio-technical systems and mi-
croblogging platforms has created a direct path from producers to con-
sumers of content and changed the way in which users get informed,
debate, and form their opinions. On the web the paradigm of content
production and consumption is particularly disintermediated; everyone
is able to produce and share contents without the mediation of an ex-
pert. This lack, especially on complex issues, might encourage specula-
tion, rumors, and mistrust. Pages about global conspiracy, chem-trails,
UFO, reptilians, or the link between vaccines and autism, proliferate on
social networks, creating and promoting alternative narratives often in
contrast to the mainstream one. Therefore, misinformation online is per-
vasive and difficult to correct.
To face the issue, several algorithmic-driven solutions have been pro-
posed e.g., Google is developing a trustworthiness score to rank query
results (65). Similarly, Facebook has proposed a community-driven ap-
proach where users can flag false contents to correct the News Feed al-
gorithm (66). More precisely, the update to News Feed reduces the dif-
fusion of posts reported as hoaxes and adds an annotation to posts that
have received many of these types of reports to warn other users on Face-
book. However, the matter is controversial, because it raises fears that
the free circulation of content may be threatened and that the proposed
algorithms may be inaccurate or ineffective (67).
On the other hand, the diffusion of unreliable contents might lead to
confuse unverified stories with their satirical counterparts. Indeed, it has
been noticed the proliferation of satirical pages producing demential im-
itation of conspiracy theses. In fact, there is a large variety of groups,
known as trolls, behind the creation of Facebook pages as a caricatural
version of conspiracy news. Their activities range from controversial
comments and satirical posts mimicking alternative news sources, to the
fabrication of purely fictitious statements, heavily unrealistic and sarcas-
tic. Sometimes, these memes become viral and are used as evidence in
online debates from political activists. Simultaneously, it has also been
observed the rapid spread of blogs and pages devoted to debunk false
claims, namely debunkers.
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Such a scenario makes crucial the quantitative understanding of the
social determinants related to content selection, information consump-
tion, and beliefs formation and revision. In (68) authors study how 2.3M
of Facebook users consumed different information at the edge of politi-
cal discussion and news during the Italian electoral competition of 2013,
showing that the social response is not affected by the topic nor by the
qualitative nature of the information. Indeed, in (69) authors investigate
how information related to very distinct narratives – i.e., mainstream sci-
entific and conspiracy news – is consumed and shapes communities on
Facebook, showing the emergence of polarized communities around dis-
tinct types of contents. Moreover, they find that usual consumers of con-
spiracy news result to be extremely focused and self-contained on their
specific contents. Indeed, such a polarized structure facilitates the re-
inforcement and the selection of contents by confirmation bias. Based
on these results, the researchers have considered to verify the effects of
debunking campaigns aiming at correcting the spreading of false infor-
mation on social media. In (70) they show that usual consumers of con-
spiracy news, when exposed to debunking news, are more prone (30%)
to continue interacting with conspiracy-like information than those not
exposed. In other words, trying to persuade a conspiracy user to let her
beliefs fall causes exactly the opposite effect. Furthermore, by measuring
the response to the injection of false information (parodistic imitations
of alternative stories) they find that users prominently interacting with
alternative information sources – i.e. more exposed to unsubstantiated
claims – are more prone to interact with intentional and parodistic false
claims (71). Indeed, homophily and polarization may be the key metrics
to identify the communities of a social network where false or misleading
rumors are more likely to spread (72).
Moreover, in (73) we show that the size of the echo chambers influ-
ences the size of Facebook spreading cascades. In addition, when focus-
ing on the emotional dynamics inside and between the two echo cham-
bers, we find that the sentiment of users on science and conspiracy pages
tends to be negative, and is more and more negative when the discussion
becomes longer or users activity on the social network increase (74). In
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particular, the discussion degenerates when the two polarized commu-
nities interact with one another.
Thus far we have focused on the behavior of the echo chambers seen
from the outside, showing that contents are selected by confirmation bias
and other information is ignored or rejected. Going inside the conspiracy
echo chamber (75), we find that the topics belong to four main categories:
Diet, Environment, Geopolitics, and Health. Moreover, we show that the
more a user is active, the more he is likely to span all categories i.e., once
inside a conspiracy narrative users tend to embrace the overall corpus.
Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of debunking on 54M users
of Facebook US (36) . Our findings confirm the existence of echo cham-
bers where users interact primarily with either conspiracy-like or scien-
tific pages. Both groups interact similarly with the information within
their echo chamber. By examining 50K posts we find that attempts at
debunking are largely ineffective. For one, only a small fraction of usual
consumers of unsubstantiated information interact with the posts. Fur-
thermore, we show that those few are often the most committed conspir-
acy users and rather than internalizing debunking information, they of-
ten react to it negatively. Indeed, after interacting with debunking posts,
users retain, or even increase, their engagement within the conspiracy
echo chamber.
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CHAPTER
THREE
EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS IN THE AGE OF
MISINFORMATION
On online social media users tend to aggregate around specific contents
and to form polarized group. Thus it might be supposed that users be-
come more and more extreme in their beliefs and reinforce their initial
views after discussing online. To investigate such an hypothesis, in this
chapter we explore the emotional contagion of online collective debates
around specific types of information – i.e., science and conspiracy news1.
In particular, focusing on polarized users – i.e., users that are mainly
active only on one type of content – we analyze their sentiment when
they discuss both within their echo chamber and with the opposite fac-
tion. This work provide important insights about the relative influence of
like-minded people when discussing on topics related to their preferred
narrative.
1This work was carried out in collaboration with Petra Kralj Novak, Igor Mozeticˇ, et al.
and published on PLoS ONE on September 2015. FZ conceived, designed, and performed
the experiments; analyzed the data; contributed to writing and reviewing the manuscript.
See (74) for further details.
15
3.1 Introduction
People online get informed, discuss and shape their opinions (76; 77; 78).
Indeed, microblogging platforms such as Facebook and Twitter allow
for the direct and disintermediated production and consumption of con-
tents (32; 79; 80; 81). The information heterogeneity might facilitate users
selective exposure to specific content and hence the aggregation in ho-
mophilous communities (47; 72; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87). In such echo-
chambers users interaction with different narratives is reduced and the
resulting debates are often polarized (misinformation) (68; 69; 70; 71; 73;
75).
Unfortunately, despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about collective intelli-
gence (5; 88; 89), the direct and undifferentiated access to the knowledge
production process is causing opposite effects – e.g., the recent case of
Jade Helm 15 (90) where a simple military exercise turned out to be per-
ceived as the beginning of the civil war in the US. Unsubstantiated ru-
mors often jump the credulity barrier and trigger naive social responses.
To an extent that, recently, the World Economic Forum labeled massive
digital misinformation as one of the main threats to our society. Individu-
als may be uninformed or misinformed, and the debunking campaigns
against unsubstantiated rumors do not seem to be effective (8).
Indeed, the factors behind the acceptance of a claim (whether sub-
stantiated or not) may be altered by normative social influence or by the
coherence with the system of beliefs of the individual (91; 92; 93; 94; 95),
making the preferential driver of contents the confirmation bias – i.e., the
tendency to select and interpret information coherently with one’s sys-
tem of beliefs.
In (68; 69; 71) it has been pointed out that the more users are exposed
to unsubstantiated rumors, the more they are likely to jump the credulity
barrier. Recent studies (96; 97) pointed out that reading comments affects
the perception of the topic and, thus, the discussion.
In this work we analyze a collection of conspiracy and scientific news
sources in the Italian Facebook over a time span of four years. The main
distinctive feature of the two categories of pages is the possibility to ver-
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ify the reported content. Scientific news are generally fact-checked and
are the results of a peer review process. Conversely, conspiracy news
are generally partial information about a secret plot. We identify pages
diffusing conspiracy news – i.e., pages promoting contents neglected by
main stream media and scientific pages – aiming at diffusing scientific
results. To have an exhaustive list of pages, we define the space of our
investigation with the help of Facebook groups very active in debunking
conspiracy stories and unverified rumors (Protesi di Complotto, Che vuol
dire reale, La menzogna diventa verita` e passa alla storia).
We target emotional dynamics inside and across content polarized
communities. In particular, we apply sentiment analysis techniques to
the comments of the Facebook posts, and study the aggregated sentiment
with respect to scientific and conspiracy-like information. The sentiment
analysis is based on a supervised machine learning approach, where we
first annotate a substantial sample of comments, and then build a Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM (98)) classification model. The model is then
applied to associate each comment with one sentiment value: negative,
neutral, or positive. The sentiment is intended to express the emotional
attitude of Facebook users when posting comments.
Although other studies apply sentiment analysis to social media (99;
100; 101; 102), our work is the first linking the interplay between commu-
nities emerging around shared narratives and specifically addressing the
emotional dynamics with respect to misinformation spreading. Indeed,
this work provides important insights toward the understanding of the
social factors behind contents consumption and the formation of polar-
ized and homophilous clusters with a specific interest in conspiracy-like
information.
We focus on the emotional behavior of about 280K Facebook Italian
users and through a thorough quantitative analysis, we find that the
sentiment on conspiracy pages tends to be more negative than that on
science pages. In addition, by focusing on polarized users – i.e., users
mainly exposed to one specific content type (science or conspiracy) – we
capture an overall increase of the negativity of the sentiment. According
to our results, the more active polarized users are, the more they tend to
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be negative, both on science and conspiracy. Furthermore, the sentiment
of polarized users is negative also when they interact with one another.
Also, as the number of comments increases – i.e., the discussion turns
longer – the sentiment is more and more negative.
3.2 Results and Discussion
3.2.1 Sentiment Classification
Emotional attitude towards different topics can be roughly approximated
by the sentiment expressed in texts. It is difficult to exactly formalize
the sentiment measures since there are often disagreements between hu-
mans, and even individuals are not consistent with themselves.
In this study, as is often in the sentiment analysis literature (103), we
have approximated the sentiment with an ordinal scale of three values:
negative (−), neutral (0), and positive (+). Even with this rough approx-
imation, and disagreements on single cases, it turns out that on a large
scale, when one deals with thousands of sentiment assignments, the ag-
gregated sentiment converges to stable values (104).
Our approach to automatic sentiment classification of texts is based
on supervised machine learning. There are four steps: (i) a sample of
texts is manually annotated with sentiment, (ii) the labeled set is used to
train and tune a classifier, (iii) the classifier is evaluated on an indepen-
dent test set or by cross-validation, and (iv) the classifier is applied to the
whole set of texts.
We have collected over one million of Facebook comments. About
20K were randomly selected for manual annotation. We have engaged
22 native Italian speakers, active on Facebook, to manually annotate the
comments by sentiment. The annotation is supported by a web-based
platform Goldfinch2 and was accomplished in two months. About 20%
of the comments were intentionally duplicated, in order to measure the
mutual (dis)agreement of human annotators.
2provided by Sowa Labs: http://www.sowalabs.com
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There are several measures to evaluate the performance of classifica-
tion models and the inter-annotator agreement. We argue that the latter
provides an upper bound that the best classification model can achieve.
In practice, however, different learning algorithms have various limita-
tions, and, most importantly, only a limited amount of training data is
available. In order to compare the classifier performance to the inter-
annotator agreement, we have selected three measures which are ap-
plied to evaluate both, performance and agreement: Accuracy , F1, and
Accuracy±1. Exact definitions are in the Methods section, here we just
briefly summarize them. Accuracy is the fraction of correctly classified
examples for all three sentiment classes – no ordering between the classes
is taken into account, and all three are treated equally. F1 is the harmonic
mean of precision and recall for a selected class. F1(−,+) is the average
of F1 for the negative and positive class only, ignoring the neutral class.
It is a standard measure of performance for sentiment classification (105).
The idea is that the misclassification of neutral sentiment can be ignored
as it is less important then the extremes, i.e., negative or positive senti-
ment (however, it still affects their precision and recall). Accuracy±1 (an
abbreviation for Accuracy within 1) completely ignores the neutral class.
It counts as errors just the negative sentiment examples predicted as pos-
itive, and vice versa. It takes into account the fact that the neutral class
is between the negative and the positive, and tolerates misclassifications
within neighbouring classes.
Table 1 gives the evaluation results. In the case of the inter-annotator
agreement, 3,262 examples were labeled twice by two different annota-
tors, and measures assess their agreement. In the case of a sentiment
classifier evaluation, we applied 10-fold cross-validation. The results in
Table 1 are the average of 10 classifiers, with 95% confidence interval.
One can see that the average classifier has reached a performance close
to human agreement. In terms of extreme errors, i.e., 1−Accuracy±1
the performance of the classifier is as good as the agreement between the
annotators. However, in terms of Accuracy and F1, there is still some
room for improvement. We speculate that the main reason for the gap
is a relatively low number of annotated examples. Based on our experi-
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ence in training SVM classifiers in other domains (such as stock market,
elections, generic tweets, etc.), we estimate that about 50,000 to 100,000
training examples are needed to reach the level of the inter-annotator
agreement.
Annotator agreement Sentiment classifier
No. of testing examples 3, 262 19, 642
Accuracy(−, 0,+) 72.0% 64.8±1.1%
F1(−,+) 73.3% 65.5±1.0%
Accuracy±1(−,+) 97.2% 97.0±0.3%
Table 1: Comparison of the inter-annotator agreement and classifier per-
formance over three evaluation measures. The results for an average sen-
timent classifier are from 10-fold cross-validation, with 95% confidence in-
terval.
Fig. 2 gives the distribution of sentiment values after applying the
classification model to the entire set of over one million comments. We
assume that the sentiment values are ordered, and that the difference
from the neutral value to both extremes, negative and positive, is the
same. Thus one can map the sentiment values from ordinal to a real-
valued interval [−1,+1]. The mean sentiment over the entire set is−0.34,
prevailingly negative.
3.2.2 Sentiment on Science and Conspiracy Posts
The sentiment analysis and classification task allowed us to associate
each comment of our dataset to a sentiment value – i.e.,−1 if negative, 0 if
neutral, and 1 if positive. Taking all the comments of science and conspir-
acy posts, we can simply divide them into negative, neutral and positive
(Fig. 3, left), and analyze their proportions. We find that 70% of comments
on science pages is neutral or positive, differently from conspiracy pages
(51%). Moreover, comments on science pages are twice as positive (20%)
than those on conspiracy pages (10%).
To measure the effect induced on users by a post, we compute the
average sentiment of all its comments. We grouped posts sentiment by
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Figure 2: Sentiment distribution over the entire set of one million com-
ments.
Figure 3: Proportions of negative, neutral and positive comments (left),
posts (center), and users (right) both on science and conspiracy pages.
defining three thresholds in order to equally divide the space; in partic-
ular, we say a post to be negative if the average sentiment ∈ [−1,−0.3],
neutral if ∈ (−0.3, 0.3), and positive if ∈ [0.3, 1]. Fig. 3 (center) shows the
aggregated sentiment of science and conspiracy posts. Notice that the
sentiment of conspiracy posts is mainly negative (54%), differently from
science posts, for which the negative sentiment represents only the 27%.
On the other hand, it is twice as positive for science posts (23%) than for
conspiracy posts (11%).
When focusing on users, the approach is analogous. We define the
sentiment of a user as the mean of the sentiment of all her comments.
The mean sentiment for each user is then classified as negative, neutral,
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or positive by means of the same thresholds used for posts. Fig. 3 (right)
shows the aggregated sentiment both for science and conspiracy users.
We find that the sentiment of users commenting on conspiracy pages is
mainly negative (55%), while the sentiment of a small fraction of users
(10%) is positive. On the contrary, the sentiment of users commenting
on science pages is particularly neutral (45%), and negative only for 29%
of users. Almost the same percentage (26%) is represented by positive
sentiment.
3.2.3 Sentiment and Virality
Now we focus on the interplay between the virality of a post and its
generated sentiment. In particular we want to understand how the sen-
timent varies for increasing levels of comments, likes, and shares. Notice
that each of these actions has a particular meaning (106; 107; 108). A like
stands for a positive feedback to the post; a share expresses the will to
increase the visibility of a given information; and a comment is the way
in which online collective debates take form around the topic promoted
by posts. Comments may contain negative or positive feedbacks with
respect to the post. Fig. 4 shows the aggregated sentiment of a post as a
function of its number of comments (top), likes (center), and shares (bot-
tom) both for science (left) and conspiracy (right) posts. The sentiment has
been regressed w.r.t. the logarithm of the number of comments (resp.,
likes, shares). We do not show confidence intervals, since they are de-
fined (C.I. 95%) as X¯ ± S.E. = X¯ ± 1.96 σ√
n
and when n→∞, S.E. = 0.
We notice that the sentiment decreases both for science and conspiracy
when the number of comments of the post increases. However, we also
note that it becomes more positive for science posts when the number of
likes and shares increase, differently from conspiracy posts.
To assess the direct relationship between the number of comments
and the negativity of the sentiment, a randomization test was performed.
In particular, we took all the comments of science (resp., conspiracy)
posts and randomly reassigned the original sentiments. Then, we re-
gressed the sentiment w.r.t. the number of comments and compared the
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Figure 4: Sentiment and post consumption. Aggregated sentiment of
posts as a function of their number of comments, likes, and shares, both
for science (left) and conspiracy (right). Negative (respectively, neutral, pos-
itive) sentiment is denoted by red (respectively, yellow, blue) color. The
sentiment has been regressed w.r.t. the logarithm of the number of com-
ments/likes/shares.
obtained slope with the one shown in Fig. 4 (top). Over 10K randomized
tests, the obtained slope was always greater than the original one. More
precisely, while the slope for the original comments for Science is equal to
−0.051 (resp., −0.070 for Conspiracy), the quantiles of the distribution of
the slopes in the randomized test are: Q0 = −0.010, Q1 = −0.002, Q2 =
−0.00002, Q3 = 0.002, Q4 = 0.010 (resp., Q0 = −0.004, Q1 = −0.0008,
Q2 = −0.000004, Q3 = 0.0008, Q4 = 0.005, for Conspiracy). There-
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fore, given that the negative relationship between the sentiment and the
length of the discussion disappears when the comment sentiments are
randomized, we conclude that the length of the discussion is a relevant
dimension when considering the negativity of the sentiment.
Summarizing, we found that both comments and posts, as well as
users of conspiracy pages tend to be much more negative than those of
science pages. Interestingly, the sentiment becomes more and more nega-
tive when the number of comments of the post increases – i.e., the discus-
sion becomes longer – both on science and conspiracy pages. However,
differently from conspiracy posts, when the number of likes and shares
increases, the aggregated sentiment of science posts becomes more and
more positive.
3.2.4 Sentiment and Users Activity
In this section we aim at understanding more in depth how the sentiment
changes with respect to users’ engagement in one of the two communi-
ties. Previous works (69; 70; 71) showed that the distribution of the users
activity on the different contents is highly polarized. Therefore we now
want to focus on the sentiment of polarized users. More precisely, we
say a user to be polarized on science (respectively, on conspiracy) if she
left more than 95% of her likes on science (respectively, on conspiracy)
posts (for further details about the effect of the thresholding refer to the
Methods Section).
Therefore, we take all polarized users having commented at least
twice, i.e., 14, 887 out of 33, 268 users polarized on science and 67, 271
out of 135, 427 users polarized on conspiracy. Fig. 5 shows the Proba-
bility Density Function (PDF) of the mean sentiment of polarized users
with at least two comments. In Table 2 we compare the mean sentiment
of all users and polarized users having commented at least twice. Our
results show that the overall negativity increases w.r.t. all users, such a
feature is more evident on the conspiracy side.
We now want to investigate how the mean sentiment of a user changes
with respect to her commenting activity – i.e., when her total number
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Figure 5: Sentiment and polarization. Probability Density Function (PDF)
of the mean sentiment of polarized users having commented at least twice,
where −1 corresponds to negative sentiment, 0 to neutral and 1 to positive.
Science Conspiracy
Sentiment All users Polarized All users Polarized
Negative 29% 34% 55% 66%
Neutral 45% 46% 35% 27%
Positive 26% 20% 10% 7%
Table 2: Mean sentiment of all users and polarized users having commented
at least twice.
of comments increases. In Fig. 6 we show the mean sentiment of po-
larized users as a function of their number of comments. The more
active a polarized user is, the more she tends toward negative values
both on science and conspiracy posts. The sentiment has been regressed
w.r.t. the logarithm of the number of comments. Interestingly, the sen-
timent of science users decreases faster than that of conspiracy users.
We performed a randomization test taking all comments on both cat-
egories and then randomly reassigning the original sentiments. Then,
we regressed the sentiment w.r.t. the number of comments and com-
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Figure 6: Sentiment and commenting activity. Average sentiment of po-
larized users as a function of their number of comments. Negative (respec-
tively, neutral, positive) sentiment is denoted by red (respectively, yellow,
blue) color. The sentiment has been regressed w.r.t. the logarithm of the
number of comments.
pared the obtained slope with the one shown in Fig. 6. The obtained
slope over 10K randomized tests was always greater than the original
one. In particular, while the slope for the original comments for Sci-
ence is equal to −0.070 (resp., −0.037 for Conspiracy), the quantiles of
the distribution of the slopes in the randomized test are: Q0 = −0.006,
Q1 = −0.001, Q2 = 0.00001, Q3 = 0.001, Q4 = 0.006 (resp., Q0 = −0.003,
Q1 = −0.0005, Q2 = 0.00001, Q3 = 0.0005, Q4 = 0.003, for Conspir-
acy). Therefore users activity is a relevant dimension when considering
the value of the sentiment, which is more and more negative on both
categories when the users activity increases.
3.2.5 Interaction Across Communities
In this section we aim at investigating the sentiment when usual con-
sumers of science and conspiracy news meet. To do this we pick all posts
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representing the arena where the debate between science and conspiracy
users takes place. In particular, we select all posts commented at least
once by both a user polarized on science and a user polarized on con-
spiracy. We find 7, 751 such posts (out of 315, 567) – reinforcing the fact
that the two communities of users are strictly separated and do not often
interact with one another.
In Fig. 7 we show the proportions of negative, neutral, and positive
comments (left) and posts (right). The aggregated sentiment of such posts
is slightly more negative (60%) than for general posts (54% for conspir-
acy, 27% for science, see Fig. 3). When focusing on comments, we have
similar percentages of neutral (42%) and negative (48%) comments, while
a small part (10%) is represented by positive comments. We want to un-
derstand if the sentiment correlates with the length of the discussion.
Hence, we analyze how the sentiment changes when the number of com-
ments of the post increases, as we previously did for general posts (Fig. 4).
Fig. 8 shows the aggregated sentiment of such posts as a function of their
number of comments. Clearly, as the number of comments increases –
i.e., the discussion becomes longer – the sentiment is more and more
negative. Moreover, comparing with Fig. 4, when communities interact
with one another, posts show a higher concentration of negative senti-
ment. Also in this case we performed a randomization test taking all the
comments and randomly reassigning the original sentiments. Then, we
regressed the sentiment w.r.t. the number of comments and compared
the obtained slope with the one shown in Fig. 7. Over 10K randomized
tests, the obtained slope was always greater than the original one. In
particular, while the slope for the original comments is equal to −0.048,
the quantiles of the distribution of the slopes in the randomized test are:
Q0 = −0.009, Q1 = −0.002, Q2 = 0.00004, Q3 = 0.002, Q4 = 0.009.
Therefore, we conclude that the length of the discussion does affect the
negativity of the sentiment.
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Figure 7: Sentiment between communities. Proportions of negative, neu-
tral, and positive comments (left) and posts (right) of all the posts com-
mented at least once by both a user polarized on science and a user po-
larized on conspiracy.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Ethics Statement and Data Collection
The entire data collection process has been carried out exclusively through
the Facebook Graph API (109), which is publicly available, and we used
only public available data – users with privacy restrictions are not in-
cluded in the dataset – for the analysis (according to the specification set-
tings of the API). The pages from which we downloaded data are public
Facebook entities (can be accessed by anyone). Users’ content contribut-
ing to such pages is also public unless the user’s privacy settings specify
otherwise and in that case it is not available to us.
We identified two main categories of pages: conspiracy news – i.e.
pages promoting contents neglected by main stream media – and science
news. The first category includes all pages diffusing conspiracy infor-
mation – pages which disseminate controversial information, most often
lacking supporting evidence and sometimes contradictory to the official
news (i.e., conspiracy theories). The second category is that of scientific
dissemination, including scientific institutions and scientific press hav-
ing the main mission to diffuse scientific knowledge. Note that we do
not focus on the truth value of information but rather on the possibil-
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Figure 8: Sentiment and discussion. Aggregated sentiment of posts as a
function of their number of comments. Negative (respectively, neutral, pos-
itive) sentiment is denoted by red (respectively, yellow, blue) color.
ity of verifying the content of the page. While the latter is an easy task
for scientific news – e.g., by identifying the authors of the study or if
the paper passed a peer review process – it usually becomes more dif-
ficult for conspiracy-like information, if not unfeasible. We defined the
space of our investigation with the help of Facebook groups very active
in debunking conspiracy theses (Protesi di Complotto, Che vuol dire reale, La
menzogna diventa verita` e passa alla storia). We categorized pages according
to their contents and their self description. The resulting dataset – down-
loaded over a timespan of four years (2010 to 2014) – is composed of 73
public Italian Facebook pages and it is the same used in (69) and (70).
To the best of our knowledge, the final dataset is the complete set of all
scientific and conspiracy information sources active in the Italian Face-
book scenario. Table 3 summarizes the details of our data collection (see
Appendix B.1 for the complete list of pages).
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Science Conspiracy Total
Pages 34 39 73
Posts 62, 075 208, 591 270, 666
Likes 2, 505, 399 6, 659, 382 9, 164, 781
Comments 180, 918 836, 591 1, 017, 509
Shares 1, 471, 088 16, 326, 731 17, 797, 819
Likers 332, 357 864, 047 1, 196, 404
Commenters 53, 438 226, 534 279, 972
Table 3: Breakdown of the Facebook dataset.
3.3.2 Classification and Annotator Agreement Measures
Our approach to sentiment classification of texts is based on supervised
machine learning, where a sample of texts is first manually annotated
with sentiment and then used to train and evaluate a classifier. The clas-
sifier is then applied to the whole corpus. The measures to assess the
agreement between annotators and the quality of the classifier are based
on coincidence and confusion matrices, respectively.
Annotators were asked to label each text with negative ≺ neutral ≺
positive sentiment. When two annotators are given the same text, they
can either agree (both give the same label) or disagree (they give different
labels). The annotators can disagree in two ways: one label is neutral
while the other is extreme (negative or positive), or both are extreme: one
negative and one positive – we call this severe disagreement. A convenient
way to represent the overall (dis)agreement between the annotators is a
coincidence matrix, where each text that is annotated twice appears in
the table twice. Table 4 gives a generic 3 × 3 annotator agreement table,
while the actual data are in Tables 5 and 6. All agreements are on the
diagonal of the table. As the labels are ordered (negative ≺ neutral ≺
positive), the further the cell from the diagonal, the more severe is the
error. From such a table one can calculate the annotator agreement (the
sum of the main diagonal divided by the number of all the elements in
the table) and the severe disagreement: the sum of top right and bottom
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left corners divided by the number of all the elements in the table.
To compare the predictions of a classifier to a golden standard (manu-
ally annotated data, in our case), a confusion matrix is used. Table 4 also
represents a generic 3 × 3 confusion matrix for the (ordered) sentiment
classification case. Each element 〈x, y〉 represents the number of exam-
ples from the actual class x, predicted as class y. All agreements/correct
predictions are in the diagonal of the table. In the ordinal classification
case, the further the cell from the diagonal, the more severe is the error.
Actual/Predicted Negative Neutral Positive Total
Negative 〈−,−〉 〈−, 0〉 〈−,+〉 〈−, ∗〉
Neutral 〈0,−〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0,+〉 〈0, ∗〉
Positive 〈+,−〉 〈+, 0〉 〈+,+〉 〈+, ∗〉
Total 〈∗,−〉 〈∗, 0〉 〈∗,+〉 N
Table 4: A generic 3× 3 coincidence matrix/confusion matrix. An element
〈x, y〉 denotes the number of examples from the actual class x, predicted as
class y.
Accuracy is the fraction of correctly classified examples:
Accuracy =
〈−,−〉+ 〈0, 0〉+ 〈+,+〉
N
Accuracy within n (110) allows for a wider range of predictions to be
considered correct. We use Accuracy within 1 (Accuracy±1) where only
misclassifications from negative to positive and vice-versa are considered
incorrect:
Accuracy±1(−,+) = 1− 〈+,−〉+ 〈−,+〉
N
F1(+,−) is the macro-averaged F -score of the positive and negative
classes, a standard evaluation measure (105) used also in the SemEval
competition3 for sentiment classification tasks:
F1(+,−) = F1+ + F1−
2
3http://alt.qcri.org/semeval2015/
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F1 is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall for each class (111):
F1 = 2 · Precision · Recall
Precision + Recall
Precision for class x is the fraction of correctly predicted examples out
of all the predictions with class x:
Precisionx =
〈x, x〉
〈∗, x〉
Recall for class x is the fraction of correctly predicted examples out of
all the examples with actual class x:
Recallx =
〈x, x〉
〈x, ∗〉
From the above tables and definitions, one can see that the annota-
tor agreement is equivalent to Accuracy and that severe disagreement is
equivalent to 1−Accuracy±1. F1 has no counterpart between the annota-
tor agreement measures, but is a standard measure in evaluation of sen-
timent classifiers. On the other hand, Cohen’s kappa (112) is a standard
measure of inter-rater agreement, but rarely used to evaluate classifica-
tion models. The original Cohen’s kappa is applicable to categorical (un-
ordered) classes, and weighted kappa was devised for ordered classes.
We use Cohen’s weighted kappa (113) to compare the inter-annotator agree-
ment and self-agreement.
3.3.3 Data Annotation
Data annotation is a process in which some predefined labels are as-
signed to each data point. A subset of 19,642 comments from the Face-
book dataset of one million (Table 3) was selected for manual sentiment
annotation and later used to train a sentiment classifier. A user-friendly
web and mobile devices annotation platform Goldfinch4 was used.
Trustworthy Italian native speakers, active on Facebook, were en-
gaged for the annotations. The annotation task was to label each Face-
book comment – isolated from its context – as negative, neutral, or positive.
4provided by Sowa Labs: http://www.sowalabs.com/
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The guideline given to the annotators was to estimate the emotional at-
titude of the user when posting a comment to Facebook. The exact ques-
tion an annotator should answer was: “Is the user happy (pleased, satis-
fied), or unhappy (angry, sad, frustrated), or neutral?” A dedicated Face-
book group was formed to dispatch detailed annotation instructions,
to provide a forum for discussion, and to post ongoing annotation re-
sults which stimulated the annotators to contribute. During the anno-
tation process, which lasted for about two months, the annotator per-
formance was monitored in terms of the inter-annotator agreement and
self-agreement, based on 20% of the comments which were intentionally
duplicated. No compensation, other then gratitude and personal satis-
faction for contributing to interesting scientific research, was awarded.
Negative Neutral Positive Total
Negative 2,482 545 90 3,117
Neutral 545 1,474 277 2,296
Positive 90 277 744 1,111
Total 3,117 2,296 1,111 6,524
Table 5: A coincidence matrix for the inter-annotator agreement, excluding
self-agreement.
The annotation process resulted in 19,642 sentiment labeled comments,
3,902 of them annotated twice. Out of 3,902 duplicates, 3,262 were polled
twice to two different annotators and are used to assess the inter-annotator
agreement, and 640 were polled twice to the same annotator and are used
to asses the annotators’ self-agreement. The coincidence matrices with
the inter-annotator agreement and self-agreement are in Tables 5 and 6,
respectively.
Note that, in a coincidence matrix, each annotated example appears
twice (once for each of the two annotators), thus the matrix is symmetric.
This is in contrast to a confusion matrix where one knows the ground
truth, and the matrix values are the number of examples in the actual
and predicted classes.
The four evaluation measures, defined above, were used to quantify
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Negative Neutral Positive Total
Negative 486 57 6 549
Neutral 57 434 19 510
Positive 6 19 196 221
Total 549 510 221 1280
Table 6: A coincidence matrix for the annotators’ self-agreement.
the inter-annotator and the annotators’ self-agreement. The results are in
Table 7.
Inter-annotator Annotators’
agreement self-agreement
No. of overlapping examples 3, 262 640
Accuracy(−, 0,+) 72.0% 87.2%
F1(−,+) 73.3% 88.7%
Accuracy±1(−,+) 97.2% 99.1%
Cohen’s weighted kappa 0.61 0.82
Table 7: Comparison of the inter-annotator and self-agreement over four
evaluation measures.
3.3.4 Classification
Ordinal classification, also known as ordinal regression, is a form of multi-
class classification where there is a natural ordering between the classes,
but no meaningful numeric difference between them (110). We treat
sentiment classification as an ordinal regression task with three ordered
classes. We apply the wrapper approach, described in (114), with two
linear-kernel Support Vector Machine (SVM) (98) classifiers. SVM is a
state-of-the-art supervised learning algorithm, well suited for large scale
text categorization tasks, and robust on large feature spaces. The two
SVM classifiers were trained to distinguish the extreme classes (negative
and positive) from the rest (neutral plus positive, and neutral plus negative,
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respectively). During prediction, if both classifiers agree, they yield the
common class, otherwise, if they disagree, the assigned class is neutral.
The sentiment classifier was trained and tuned on the training set
of 15,714 annotated comments. The comments were processed into the
standard Bag-of-Words (BoW) representation, with the following settings:
lemmatized BoW include unigrams and bigrams, minimum n-gram fre-
quency is five, TF-IDF weighting, no stop-word removal, and normal-
ized vectors. Additional features and settings were chosen, based on
the results of 10-fold stratified cross-validation on the training set: nor-
malization of diacritical characters, url replacement, length of text, pres-
ence of upper cased words, negation (language specific), swearing (lan-
guage specific), positive words from a predefined dictionary (language
specific), unusual punctuation (several exclamation or question marks,
...), unusually repeated characters, happy or sad emoticons in the text,
and their presence at the end of the sentence.
The trained sentiment classifier was then evaluated on a disjoint test
set of the remaining 3,928 comments. The confusion matrix between the
annotators (actual classes) and the classifier (predicted classes) is in Ta-
ble 8. The sentiment class distribution, after applying the classifier to the
whole set of one million Facebook comments, is in Fig. 2.
Actual/Predicted Negative Neutral Positive Total
Negative 1,208 501 32 1,741
Neutral 509 987 103 1,599
Positive 86 183 319 588
Total 1,803 1,671 454 3,928
Table 8: A confusion matrix of the sentiment classifier on the test set.
Another evaluation was performed by a 10-fold cross-validation on
the complete set of 19,642 training examples. The confusion matrix be-
tween the annotators and the 10 classifiers is in Table 9. The averaged
evaluation measures over 10 classifiers, with 95% confidence interval are
in Table 1.
35
Actual/Predicted Negative Neutral Positive Total
Negative 5,779 2,669 302 8,750
Neutral 1,969 5,090 839 7,898
Positive 293 834 1,867 2,994
Total 8,041 8,593 3,008 19,642
Table 9: A confusion matrix of sentiment classifiers on the 10-fold cross-
validated complete training set.
3.3.5 Labelling Algorithm
The labelling algorithm may be described as a thresholding strategy on
the total number of users likes. Considering the total number of likes of
a user Lu on both posts P in categories S and C. Let ls and lc define the
number of likes of a user u on Ps or Pc, respectively denoting posts from
scientific or conspiracy pages. Then, the total like activity of a user on one
category is given by lsLu . Fixing a threshold θ we can discriminate users
with enough activity on one category. More precisely, the condition for a
user to be labeled as a polarized user in one category can be described as
ls
Lu
∨ lcLu > θ. In Fig. 9 we show the number of polarized users as a func-
tion of θ. Both curves decrease with a comparable rate. Fig. 10 shows the
Probability Density Function (PDF) of the mean sentiment of all polar-
ized users (top) and polarized users with at least five likes (bottom). Note
that both densities are qualitatively similar. In Fig. 11 we show the mean
sentiment of polarized users as a function of the threshold θ.
3.4 Conclusions
In this work we analyzed the emotional dynamics on pages of opposite
worldviews, science and conspiracy. Previous works (69; 70; 71) showed
that users are strongly polarized towards the two narratives. Moreover,
we found that users of both categories seem to not distinguish between
verified contents and unintentional false claims. In this manuscript we
focused on the emotional behavior of the same users on Facebook. In
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Figure 9: Polarized users and activity.The number of polarized users as a
function of the thresholding value θ on the two categories.
general, we noticed that the sentiment on conspiracy pages tends to be
more negative than that on science pages. In addition, by focusing on
polarized users, we identified an overall increase of the negativity of the
sentiment. In particular, the more active polarized users, the more they
tend to be negative, both on science and conspiracy. Furthermore, the
sentiment of polarized users is negative also when they interact with one
another. Also in this case, as the number of comments increases – i.e.,
the discussion becomes longer – the sentiment of the post is more and
more negative. This work provides important insights about the emo-
tional dynamics in a disintermediated environment. Indeed, recent stud-
ies (96; 97) pointed out that reading comments of other user may affect
the discussion. Our findings confirm such a phenomenon and make ex-
plicit that the longer the discussion the more negative the sentiment. In
particular, discussions around conspiracy news degenerate faster than
the scientific one. This latter point opens to interesting question about
the quasi-religious mentality of conspiracists (115) and the way in which
such an echo-chamber digests and debate news and events.
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Figure 10: Sentiment of Polarized Users. Probability Density Function
(PDF) of the mean sentiment of all polarized users (top) and polarized users
with at least five likes, where −1 corresponds to negative sentiment, 0 to
neutral and 1 to positive.
Figure 11: Sentiment and Engagement. Average sentiment of polarized
users as a function of the threshold θ, i.e., the engagement degree, intended
as the number of likes a polarized user put in her own category.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
DEBUNKING IN A WORLD OF TRIBES
Users tend to focus on specific narratives and to join polarized groups
where debating influences negatively their emotions. As a further step
towards the understanding of polarization dynamics, in this chapter we
want to test the response of polarized users – users interacting mainly
with just one type of content – to dissenting information1.
Focusing on users in the US conspiracy echo chamber we want to
characterize their interaction with information aimed at debunking their
beliefs i.e., attempts to correct unverified rumors2.
4.1 Introduction
Socio-technical systems and microblogging platforms such as Facebook
and Twitter have created a direct path from producers to consumers of
1This work was carried out in collaboration with Prof. Shlomo Havlin et al. and is
currently under review on PLoS ONE. FZ conceived and designed the experiments; per-
formed the analysis and interpreted the results; contributed to writing and reviewing the
manuscript. See (36) for further details.
2The research work presented in this chapter had a profound impact on the public opin-
ion and on the media. Based on such results, Caitlin Dewey decided to close her weekly
column on the Washington Post, What was Fake, launched on May 2014 (116). Prof. Cass
R. Sunstein, the former administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs, expressed his interest in the same research on Bloomberg View, and argued
that the best solution is to promote a culture of humility and openness (117).
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content, changing the way users get informed, debate ideas, and shape
their worldviews (47; 85; 118; 119; 120). Misinformation on online social
media is pervasive and represents one of the main threats to our society
according to the World Economic Forum (9; 121). The diffusion of false
rumors affects public perception of reality as well as the political debate
(8). Indeed, links between vaccines and autism, the belief that 9/11 was
an inside job, or the more recent case of Jade Helm 15 – a simple military
exercise that was perceived as the imminent threat of the civil war in
the US – are just few examples of the consistent body of the collective
narratives grounded on unsubstantiated information.
Confirmation bias plays a pivotal role in cascades dynamics and fa-
cilitates the emergence of echo chambers (73). Indeed, users online show
the tendency a) to select information that adheres to their system of be-
liefs even when containing parodistic jokes; and b) to join polarized groups
(122). Recently, researches have shown (68; 69; 71; 74; 75; 123) that contin-
ued exposure to unsubstantiated rumors may be a good proxy to detect
gullibility – i.e., jumping the credulity barrier by accepting highly im-
plausible theories – on online social media. Narratives, especially those
grounded on conspiracy theories, play an important cognitive and social
function in simplifying causation. They are formulated in a way that is
able to reduce the complexity of reality and to tolerate a certain level of
uncertainty (91; 92; 94). However, conspiracy thinking creates or reflects
a climate of disengagement from mainstream society and recommended
practices (124).
Several efforts are striving to contrast misinformation spreading from
algorithmic-based solutions to tailored communication strategies (125;
126; 127; 128; 129; 130) but not much is known about their efficacy. In this
work we characterize the consumption of debunking posts on Facebook
and, more generally, the reaction of users to dissenting information.
We perform a thorough quantitative analysis of 54 million US Face-
book users and study how they consume scientific and conspiracy-like
contents. We identify two main categories of pages: conspiracy news
– i.e. pages promoting contents neglected by main stream media – and
science news. Using an approach based on (68; 69; 71), we further ex-
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plore Facebook pages that are active in debunking conspiracy theses (see
Section 4.3 for further details about data collection).
Notice that we do not focus on the quality of the information but
rather on the possibility for verification. Indeed, it is easy for scientific
news to identify the authors of the study, the university under which
the study took place and if the paper underwent a peer review process.
On the other hand, conspiracy-like content is difficult to verify because
it is inherently based upon suspect information and is derived allega-
tions and a belief in secrets from the public. The self-description of many
conspiracy pages on Facebook, indeed, claims that they inform people
about topics neglected by mainstream media and science. Pages like I
don’t trust the government, Awakening America, or Awakened Citizen, pro-
mote wide-ranging content from aliens, chem-trails, to the causal relation
between vaccinations and autism or homosexuality. Conversely, science
news pages – e.g., Science, Science Daily, Nature – are active in diffusing
posts about the most recent scientific advances.
The list of pages has been built by censing all pages with the support
of very active debunking groups (see Section 4.3 for more details). The
final dataset contains pages reporting on scientific and conspiracy-like
news. On a time span of five years (Jan 2010, Dec 2014) we downloaded
all public posts (with the related lists of likes and comments) of 83 sci-
entific and 330 conspiracy pages. In addition, we identified 66 Facebook
pages aiming at debunking conspiracy theories.
Our analysis shows that two well-formed and highly segregated com-
munities exist around conspiracy and scientific topics – i.e., users are
mainly active in only one category. Focusing on users interactions with
respect to their preferred content, we find similarities in the consumption
of posts. Different kinds of content aggregate polarized groups of users
(echo chambers). At this stage we want to test the role of confirmation
bias with respect to dissenting (resp., confirmatory) information from the
conspiracy (resp., science) echo chamber. Focusing on a set of 50, 220 de-
bunking posts we measure the interaction of users from both conspiracy
and science echo chambers. We find that such posts remain confined to
the scientific echo chamber mainly. Indeed, the majority of likes on de-
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bunking posts is left by users polarized towards science (∼ 67%), while
only a small minority (∼ 7%) by users polarized towards conspiracy.
However, independently of the echo chamber, the sentiment expressed
by users when commenting on debunking posts is mainly negative.
4.2 Results and Discussion
The aim of this work is to test the effectiveness of debunking campaigns
on online social media. As a more general aim we want to character-
ize and compare users attention with respect to a) their preferred narra-
tive and b) information dissenting from such a narrative. Specifically we
want to understand how users usually exposed to unverified informa-
tion such as conspiracy theories respond to debunking attempts.
Echo chambers
As a first step we characterize how distinct types of information – be-
longing to the two different narratives – are consumed on Facebook. In
particular we focus on users’ actions allowed by Facebook’s interaction
paradigm – i.e., likes, shares, and comments. Each action has a particu-
lar meaning (106). A like represents a positive feedback to a post; a share
expresses a desire to increase the visibility of a given information; and a
comment is the way in which online collective debates take form around
the topic of the post. Therefore, comments may contain negative or pos-
itive feedbacks with respect to the post.
Assuming that a user u has performed x and y likes on scientific and
conspiracy-like posts, respectively, we let ρ(u) = (y − x)/(y + x). Thus,
a user u for whom ρ(u) = −1 is polarized towards science, whereas a
user whose ρ(u) = 1 is polarized towards conspiracy. We define the user
polarization ρlikes ∈ [−1, 1] (resp., ρcomments) as the ratio of difference
in likes (resp., comments) on conspiracy and science posts. In Fig 12 we
show that the probability density function (PDF) for the polarization of
all users is sharply bimodal with most having (ρ(u) ∼ −1) or (ρ(u) ∼ 1).
Thus, most users may be divided into two groups, those polarized towards
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science and those polarized towards conspiracy. The same pattern holds if
we look at polarization based on comments rather than on likes.
Figure 12: Users polarization. Probability density functions (PDFs) of the
polarization of all users computed both on likes (left) and comments (right).
To further understand how these two segregated communities be-
have, we explore how they interact with their preferred type of infor-
mation. In the left panel of Fig 13 we show the distributions of the num-
ber of likes, comments, and shares on posts belonging to both scientific
and conspiracy news. As seen from the plots, all the distributions are
heavy-tailed – i.e, all the distributions are best fitted by power laws and
all possess similar scaling parameters (see Section 4.3 for further details).
We define the persistence of a post (resp., user) as the Kaplan-Meier
estimates of survival functions by accounting for the first and last com-
ment to the post (resp., of the user). In the right panel of Fig 13 we plot
the Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions of posts grouped by
category. To further characterize differences between the survival func-
tions, we perform the Peto & Peto (131) test to detect whether there is
a statistically significant difference between the two survival functions.
Since we obtain a p-value of 0.944, we can state that there are not signifi-
cant statistical differences between the posts’ survival functions on both
science and conspiracy news. Thus, the posts’ persistence is similar in
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Figure 13: Posts’ attention patterns and persistence. Left panel: Comple-
mentary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of the number of likes,
comments, and shares received by posts belonging to conspiracy (top) and
scientific (bottom) news. Right panel: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival
functions of posts belonging to conspiracy and scientific news. Error bars
are on the order of the size of the symbols.
the two echo chambers.
We continue our analysis by examining users interaction with differ-
ent kinds of posts on Facebook. In the left panel of Fig 14 we plot the
CCDFs of the number of likes and comments of users on science or con-
spiracy news. These results show that users consume information in a
comparable way – i.e, all distributions are heavy tailed (for scaling pa-
rameters and other details refer to Section 4.3). The right panel of Fig 14
shows that the persistence of users – i.e., the Kaplan-Meier estimates of
survival functions – on both types of content is nearly identical. Atten-
tion patterns of users in the conspiracy and science echo chambers reveal
that both behave in a very similar manner.
In summary, contents related to distinct narratives aggregate users
into different communities and consumption patterns are similar in both
communities.
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Figure 14: Users’ attention patterns and persistence. Left panel: Comple-
mentary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of the number of com-
ments (top), and likes (bottom), per each user on the two categories. Right
panel: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions for users on conspiracy
and scientific news. Error bars are on the order of the size of the symbols.
Response to debunking posts
Debunking posts on Facebook strive to contrast misinformation spread-
ing by providing fact-checked information to specific topics. However,
not much is known about the effectiveness of debunking to contrast mis-
information spreading. In fact, if confirmation bias plays a pivotal role
in selection criteria, then debunking might sound to users usually ex-
posed to unsubstantiated rumors like something dissenting from their
narrative. Here, we focus on the scientific and conspiracy echo chambers
and analyze consumption of debunking posts. As a preliminary step we
show how debunking posts get liked and commented according to users
polarization. Notice that we consider a user to be polarized if at least
the 95% of his liking activity concentrates just on one specific narrative.
Fig 15 shows how users’ activity is distributed on debunking posts: Left
(resp., right) panel shows the proportions of likes (resp., comments) left
by users polarized towards science, users polarized towards conspiracy,
and not polarized users. We notice that the majority of both likes and
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comments is left by users polarized towards science (resp., 66, 95% and
52, 12%), while only a small minority is made by users polarized towards
conspiracy (resp., 6, 54% and 3, 88%). Indeed, the scientific echo chamber
is the biggest consumer of debunking posts and only few users usually
active in the conspiracy echo chamber interact with debunking informa-
tion. Out of 9, 790, 906 polarized conspiracy users, just 117, 736 interacted
with debunking posts – i.e., commented a debunking post at least once.
Figure 15: Users’ activity on debunking posts. Proportions of likes (left)
and comments (right) left by users polarized towards science, users polar-
ized towards conspiracy, and not polarized users.
To better characterize users’ response to debunking attempts, we ap-
ply sentiment analysis techniques to the comments of the Facebook posts
(see Section 4.3 for further details). We use a supervised machine learn-
ing approach: first, we annotate a sample of comments and, then, we
build a Support Vector Machine (SVM) (98) classification model. Finally,
we apply the model to associate each comment with a sentiment value:
negative, neutral, or positive. The sentiment denotes the emotional attitude
of Facebook users when commenting. In Fig 16 we show the fraction of
negative, positive, and neutral comments for all users and for the polar-
ized ones. Notice that we consider only posts having at least a like, a
comment, and a share. Comments tend to be mainly negative and such
a negativity is dominant regardless users polarization.
Our findings show that debunking posts remain mainly confined within
the scientific echo chamber and only few users usually exposed to un-
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Figure 16: Users’ sentiment on debunking posts. Sentiment of comments
made by all users (left), users polarized towards science (center), and users
polarized towards conspiracy (right) on debunking posts having at least a
like, a comment, and a share.
substantiated claims actively interact with the corrections. Dissenting
information is mainly ignored. Furthermore, if we look at the sentiment
expressed by users in their comments, we find a rather negative environ-
ment.
Interaction with dissenting information
Users tend to focus on a specific narrative and select information adher-
ing to their system of beliefs while they ignore dissenting information.
However, in our scenario few users belonging to the conspiracy echo
chamber interact with debunking information. What about such users?
And further, what about the effect of their interaction with dissenting in-
formation? In this section we aim at better characterizing the consump-
tion patterns of the few users that tend to interact with dissenting infor-
mation. Focusing on the conspiracy echo chamber, in the top panel of
Fig 17 we show the distinct survival functions – i.e. the probability of
continuing in liking and commenting along time on conspiracy posts –
of users who commented or not on debunking posts. Users interacting
with debunking posts are generally more likely to survive – to pursue
their interaction with conspiracy posts.
The bottom panel of Fig 17 shows the CCDFs of the number of likes
47
Figure 17: Interaction with debunking: survival functions and attention
patterns. Top panel: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions of users
who interacted (exposed) and did not (not exposed) with debunking. Users
persistence is computed both on their likes (left) and comments (right). Bot-
tom panel: Complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of
the number of likes (left) and comments (right), per each user exposed and
not exposed to debunking.
and comments for both type of users. The Spearman’s rank correlations
coefficient between the number of likes and comments for both type of
users are very similar: ρexp = 0.53 (95% c.i. [0.529, 0.537]); ρnot exp =
0.57 (95% c.i. [0.566, 0.573]). However, we may observe that users who
commented to debunking posts are slightly more prone to comment in
general. Thus, users engaging debates with debunking posts seems to be
those few who show a higher commenting activity overall.
To further characterize the effect of the interaction with debunking
posts, as a secondary step, we perform a comparative analysis between
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the users behavior before and after they comment on debunking posts.
Fig 18 shows the liking and commenting rate – i.e, the average number
of likes (or comments) on conspiracy posts per day – before and after
the first interaction with debunking. The plot shows that users’ liking
and commenting rates increase after commenting. To further analyze
the effects of interaction with the debunking posts we use the Cox Pro-
portional Hazard model (132) to estimate the hazard of conspiracy users
exposed to – i.e., who interacted with – debunking compared to those
not exposed and we find that users not exposed to debunking are 1.76
times more likely to stop interacting with conspiracy news (see Section
4.3 for further details).
Figure 18: Interaction with debunking: comments and likes rate. Rate –
i.e., average number, over time, of likes (left) (resp., comments (right)) on
conspiracy posts of users who interacted with debunking posts.
Conclusions
Users online tend to focus on specific narratives and select information
adhering to their system of beliefs. Such a polarized environment might
foster the proliferation of false claims. Indeed, misinformation is per-
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vasive and really difficult to correct. To smooth the proliferation of un-
substantiated rumors major corporations such as Facebook and Google
are studying specific solutions. Examining the effectiveness of online de-
bunking campaigns is crucial for understanding the processes and mech-
anisms behind misinformation spreading. In this work we show the ex-
istence of social echo chambers around different narratives on Facebook
in the US. Two well-formed and highly segregated communities exist
around conspiracy and scientific topics – i.e., users are mainly active in
only one category. Furthermore, by focusing on users interactions with
respect to their preferred content, we find similarities in the way in which
both forms of content are consumed.
Our findings show that debunking posts remain confined within the
scientific echo chamber mainly and only few users usually exposed to
unsubstantiated claims actively interact with the corrections. Dissenting
information is mainly ignored and, if we look at the sentiment expressed
by users in their comments, we find a rather negative environment. Fur-
thermore we show that the few users from the conspiracy echo chamber
who interact with the debunking posts manifest a higher tendency to
comment, in general. However, if we look at their commenting and lik-
ing rate – i.e., the daily number of comments and likes – we find that their
activity in the conspiracy echo chamber increases after the interaction.
Thus, dissenting information online is ignored. Indeed, our results
suggest that debunking information remains confined within the scien-
tific echo chamber and that very few users of the conspiracy echo cham-
ber interact with debunking posts. Moreover, the interaction seems to
lead to an increasing interest in conspiracy-like content.
On our perspective the diffusion of bogus content is someway related
to the increasing mistrust of people with respect to institutions, to the in-
creasing level of functional illiteracy – i.e., the inability to understand
information correctly – affecting western countries, as well as the com-
bined effect of confirmation bias at work on a enormous basin of infor-
mation where the quality is poor. According to these settings, current
debunking campaigns as well as algorithmic solutions do not seem to
be the best options. Our findings suggest that the main problem behind
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misinformation is conservatism rather than gullibility. When users are
faced with untrusted opponents in online discussion, the latter results in
a major commitment with respect to their own echo chamber.
4.3 Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The entire data collection process is performed exclusively by means of
the Facebook Graph API (109), which is publicly available and can be
used through one’s personal Facebook user account. We used only pub-
lic available data (users with privacy restrictions are not included in our
dataset). Data was downloaded from public Facebook pages that are
public entities. Users’ content contributing to such entities is also public
unless the users’ privacy settings specify otherwise and in that case it is
not available to us. When allowed by users’ privacy specifications, we
accessed public personal information. However, in our study we used
fully anonymized and aggregated data. We abided by the terms, condi-
tions, and privacy policies of Facebook.
4.3.1 Data Collection
Data was downloaded from public Facebook pages that are accessible
to anyone virtually. The entire data collection process is performed ex-
clusively by means of the Facebook Graph API (109), which is publicly
available and can be used through one’s personal Facebook user account.
The first category includes all pages diffusing conspiracy information –
pages which disseminate controversial information, most often lacking
supporting evidence and sometimes contradictory of the official news
(i.e. conspiracy theories). The second category is that of scientific dis-
semination including scientific institutions and scientific press having
the main mission to diffuse scientific knowledge. The third category con-
tains all pages active in debunking false rumors online. We use this lat-
ter set as a testbed for the efficacy of debunking campaign. The exact
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Science Conspiracy Debunking Total
Pages 83 330 66 479
Posts 262, 815 369, 420 50, 220 682, 455
Likes 463, 966, 540 145, 388, 131 4, 160, 674 613, 515, 345
Comments 22, 093, 692 8, 307, 643 488, 279 30, 889, 614
Likers 40, 466, 440 19, 386, 132 744, 023 52, 753, 883
Commenters 7, 223, 473 3, 166, 725 139, 168 9, 812, 332
Table 10: Breakdown of Facebook dataset. Number of pages, posts, likes,
comments, likers, and commenters for science, conspiracy, and debunking
pages.
breakdown of the data is presented in Table 10 (see Appendix B.2 for the
complete list of pages).
4.3.2 Sentiment Classification
Data annotation consists in assigning some predefined labels to each
data point. We selected a subset of 24,312 comments from the Facebook
dataset (Table 10) and later used it to train a sentiment classifier. We used
a user-friendly web and mobile devices annotation platform, Goldfinch3
and engaged trustworthy English speakers, active on Facebook, for the
annotations. The annotation task was to label each Facebook comment –
isolated from its context – as negative, neutral, or positive. Each annotator
had to estimate the emotional attitude of the user when posting a com-
ment to Facebook. During the annotation process, the annotators perfor-
mance was monitored in terms of the inter-annotator agreement and self-
agreement, based on a subset of the comments which were intentionally
duplicated. The annotation process resulted in 24,312 sentiment labeled
comments, 6,555 of them annotated twice. We evaluate the self- and
inter-annotator agreements in terms of Krippendorff’s Alpha-reliability
(133), which is a reliability coefficient able to measure the agreement of
any number of annotators, often used in literature (134). Alpha is defined
3provided by Sowa Labs: http://www.sowalabs.com/
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as
Alpha = 1− Do
De
,
whereDo is the observed disagreement between annotators andDe is the
disagreement one would expect by chance. When annotators agree per-
fectly, Alpha = 1, and when the level of agreement equals the agreement
by chance, Alpha = 0. In our case, 4, 009 comments were polled twice
to two different annotators and are used to assess the inter-annotator
agreement, for which Alpha = 0.810, while 2, 546 comments were polled
twice to the same annotator and are used to asses the annotators’ self-
agreements, for which Alpha = 0.916.
We treat sentiment classification as an ordinal classification task with
three ordered classes. We remind that ordinal classification is a form of
multi-class classification where there is a natural ordering between the
classes, but no meaningful numeric difference between them (110). We
apply the wrapper approach, described in (114), with two linear-kernel
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers (98). SVM is a state-of-the-art
supervised learning algorithm, well suited for large scale text categoriza-
tion tasks, and robust on large feature spaces. The two SVM classifiers
were trained to distinguish the extreme classes – negative and positive –
from the rest – neutral plus positive, and neutral plus negative. During pre-
diction, if both classifiers agree, they yield the common class, otherwise,
if they disagree, the assigned class is neutral.
The sentiment classifier was trained and tuned on the training set
of 19,450 annotated comments. The comments were processed into the
standard Bag-of-Words (BoW) representation. The trained sentiment clas-
sifier was then evaluated on a disjoint test set of the remaining 4,862
comments. Three measures were used to evaluate the performance of
the sentiment classifier:
1. The aforementioned Alpha
2. The Accuracy , defined as the fraction of correctly classified exam-
ples:
Accuracy =
〈−,−〉+ 〈0, 0〉+ 〈+,+〉
N
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3. F1(+,−), the macro-averaged F -score of the positive and negative
classes, a standard evaluation measure (105) for sentiment classifi-
cation tasks:
F1(+,−) = F1+ + F1−
2
In general, F1 is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall for each
class (111):
F1 = 2 · Precision · Recall
Precision + Recall
where Precision for class x is the fraction of correctly predicted ex-
amples out of all the predictions with class x:
Precisionx =
〈x, x〉
〈∗, x〉
and Recall for class x is the fraction of correctly predicted examples
out of all the examples with actual class x:
Recallx =
〈x, x〉
〈x, ∗〉
The averaged evaluation are the followings: Alpha = 0.589±0.017,
Accuracy = 0.654±0.012, and F1(+,−) = 0.685±0.011. The 95% confi-
dence intervals are estimated from 10-fold cross validations.
4.3.3 Statistical Tools
Kaplan-Meier estimator. Let us define a random variable T on the in-
terval [0,∞), indicating the time an event takes place. The cumulative
distribution function (CDF), F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t), indicates the probability
that a subject selected at random will have a survival time less than or
equal some stated value t. The survival function, defined as the com-
plementary CDF (CCDF4) of T , is the probability of observing a survival
time greater than some stated value t. To estimate this probability we use
the Kaplan–Meier estimator (135). Let nt denote the number of users at risk
4We remind that the CCDF of a random variable X is one minus the CDF, the function
f(x) = Pr(X > x).
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of stop commenting at time t, and let dt denote the number of users that
stop commenting precisely at t. Then, the conditional survival probabil-
ity at time t is defined as (nt−dt)/nt. Thus, if we have N observations at
times t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tN , assuming that the events at times ti are jointly
independent, the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function at time
t is defined as
Sˆ(t) =
∏
ti≤t
(
nti − dti
nti
),
with the convention that Sˆ(t) = 1, if t < ti.
Comparison between power law distributions. Comparisons between
power law distributions of two different quantities are usually carried
out through log-likelihood ratio test (136) or Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(137). The former method relies on the ratio between the likelihood of
a model fitted on the pooled quantities and the sum of the likelihoods
of the models fitted on the two separate quantities, whereas the latter is
based on the comparison between the cumulative distribution functions
of the two quantities. However, both the afore-mentioned approaches
take into account the overall distributions, whereas more often we are
especially interested in the scaling parameter of the distribution, i.e. how
the tail of the distribution behaves. Moreover, since the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was conceived for continuous distributions, its application
to discrete data gives biased p-values. For these reasons, in this paper
we decide to compare our distributions by assess significant differences
in the scaling parameters by means of a Wald test. The Wald test we
conceive is defined as
H0 : αˆ1 − αˆ2 = 0
H1 : αˆ1 − αˆ2 6= 0,
where αˆ1 and αˆ2 are the estimates of the scaling parameters of the
two powerlaw distributions. The Wald statistics,
(αˆ1 − αˆ2)2
V AR(αˆ1)
,
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Likes Comments Shares
Power law −34,056.95 −77,904.52 −108,823.2
Poisson −22, 143, 084 −6, 013, 281 −109, 045, 636
Lognormal −35, 112.58 −82, 619.08 −113, 643.7
Exponential −36, 475.47 −87, 859.85 −119, 161.2
Table 11: Goodness of fit for posts’ attention patterns on conspiracy pages.
Likes Comments Shares
Power law −33,371.53 −2,537.418 −4,994.981
Poisson −57, 731, 533 −497, 016.2 −3, 833, 242
Lognormal −34, 016.76 −2, 620.886 −5, 126.515
Exponential −35.330, 76 −2, 777.548 −5, 415.722
Table 12: Goodness of fit for posts’ attention patterns on science pages.
where V AR(αˆ1) is the variance of αˆ1, follows a χ2 distribution with 1
degree of freedom. We reject the null hypothesis H0 and conclude that
there is a significant difference between the scaling parameters of the
two distributions if the p-value of the Wald statistics is below a given
significance level.
Attention Patterns. Different fits for the tail of the distributions have
been taken into account (lognormal, Poisson, exponential, and power
law). As for attention patterns related to posts, Goodness of fit tests
based on the log-likelihood (137) have proved that the tails are best fitted
by a power law distribution both for conspiracy and scientific news (see
Tables 11 and 12).
Log-likelihoods of different attention patterns (likes, comments, and
shares) are computed under competing distributions. The one with the
higher log-likelihood is then the better fit (137). Log-likelihood ratio tests
between power law and the other distributions yield positive ratios, and
p-value computed using Vuong’s method (138) are close to zero, indicat-
ing that the best fit provided by the power law distribution is not caused
by statistical fluctuations. Lower bounds and scaling parameters have
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Likes Comments Shares
xˆmin αˆ xˆmin αˆ xˆmin αˆ
Conspiracy 8, 995 2.73 136 2.33 1, 800 2.29
Science 62, 976 2.78 8, 890 3.27 53, 958 3.41
t-stat - 0.88 - 325.38 - 469.42
p-value - 0.3477 - < 10−6 - < 10−6
Table 13: Power law fit of posts’ attention patterns.
Likes Comments
Power law −24,044.40 −57,274.31
Poisson −294, 076.1 −334, 825.6
Lognormal −25, 177.79 −62, 415.91
Exponential −28, 068.09 −68, 650.47
Table 14: Goodness of fit for users’ attention patterns on conspiracy pages.
been estimated via minimization of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics (137);
the latter have been compared via Wald test (see Table 13).
As for users activity, Tables 14 and 15 list the fit parameters with vari-
ous canonical distributions for both conspiracy and scientific news. Table
16 shows the power law fit parameters and summarizes the estimated
lower bounds and scaling parameters for each distribution.
Cox-Hazard Model. The hazard function is modeled as
h(t) = h0(t) exp(βx),
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard and x is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 when the user has been exposed to debunking and 0 otherwise.
The hazards depend multiplicatively on the covariates, and exp(β) is the
ratio of the hazards between users exposed and not exposed to debunk-
ing. The ratio of the hazards of any two users i and j is exp(β(xi − xj)),
and is called the hazard ratio. This ratio is assumed to be constant over
time, hence the name of proportional hazard. When we consider expo-
sure to debunking by means of likes, the estimated β is 0.72742 (s.e. =
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Likes Comments
Power law −222,763.1 −42,901.23
Poisson −5, 027, 337 −260, 162.7
Lognormal −231, 319.1 −46, 752.34
Exponential −249, 771.4 −51, 345.45
Table 15: Goodness of fit for users’ attention patterns on science pages.
Likes Comments
xˆmin αˆ xˆmin αˆ
Conspiracy 900 4.07 45 2.93
Science 900 3.25 45 3.07
t-stat 952.56 17.89
p-value < 10−6 2.34× 10−5
Table 16: Power law fit of users’ attention patterns.
0.01991, p < 10−6) and the corresponding hazard ratio, exp(β), between
users exposed and not exposed is 2.07, indicating that users not exposed
to debunking are 2.07 times more likely to stop consuming conspiracy
news. Goodness of fit for the Cox Proportional Hazard Model has been
assessed by means of Likelihood ratio test, Wald test, and Score test
which provided p-values close to zero. Fig 19 (left) shows the fit of the
Cox proportional hazard model when the lifetime is computed on likes.
Moreover, if we consider exposure to debunking by means of com-
ments, the estimated β is 0.56748 (s.e. = 0.02711, p < 10−6) and the
corresponding hazard ratio, exp(β), between users exposed and not ex-
posed is 1.76, indicating that users not exposed to debunking are 1.76
times more likely to stop consuming conspiracy news. Goodness of fit
for the Cox Proportional Hazard Model has been assessed by means of
Likelihood ratio test, Wald test, and Score test, which provided p-values
close to zero. Fig 19 (right) shows the fit of the Cox proportional hazard
model when the lifetime is computed on comments.
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Figure 19: Cox-Hazard Model Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions
of users who interacted (exposed, orange) and did not (not exposed, green) with
debunking and fits of the Cox proportional hazard model. Persistence of
users is computed both on likes (left) and comments (right).
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CHAPTER
FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this chapter we discuss all the follow-ups of the research line pre-
sented in the previous sections. We know that users tend to form polar-
ized groups of like-minded people (73). Immersed in these echo cham-
bers, they frame and reinforce their world view (16; 75), acquire informa-
tion confirming their preferred narrative (69), and ignore dissenting in-
formation (36). Moreover, debating with like-minded people have been
shown to negatively influence their emotions and to burst group polar-
ization (74).
At this stage of the research we have a good understanding of the so-
cial dynamics behind group polarization and of the proliferation of un-
substantiated rumors online. However, the problem still remains com-
plex and intricate. Currently we are striving to determine key metrics
able to identify echo chambers just accounting for users’ interaction with
posts and how specific topics are perceived as critical by different groups
of users. This effort aims at framing information campaigns based on a
quantitatively tailored narrative.
To explore the criticality of topics, we may measure how different
echo chambers debate around the same topics. In the latest years one of
the most controversial subject is anthropogenic climate change. The issue
is politically polarizing (139), especially in nations with organized denial
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Figure 20: Attention Patterns. Complementary cumulative distribution
functions (CCDFs) of the number of likes, comments, and shares received
by posts belonging to Denials ((red) and Supporters (blue) pages.
campaigns (140). Studies have examined these dynamics in the blogo-
sphere (141), online comments (142), and Twitter (143), but not Facebook.
Therefore we want to extend the analysis on climate change polarization
to Facebook1. We focus on echo chambers emerging from interactions
with the pages of 76 blogs supporting/promoting climate science and 69
pages of blogs denying/questioning climate change and science (see Ap-
pendix B.3 for the complete list of pages) over a time span of six years, a
total of 500K posts with more than 4M users liking and commenting.
In Fig. 20 we show how posts of the two narratives get consumed
in terms of number of likes, comments and shares. The plots capture
similar interaction patterns, all distributions are heavy tailed. Claims
supporting and denying climate change reverberate in a comparable way
and receive a similar volume of attention on the Facebook platform.
We now want to characterize users’ mobility across the different types
of content. Hence, for each user we count the total number of her likes
and comments on posts supporting and denying climate science and de-
1This material is based on an about to be submitted co-authored paper. Authors: Fabi-
ana Zollo, Alessandro Bessi, Michela Del Vicario, Antonio Scala, Guido Caldarelli, Walter
Quattrociocchi and Riley Dunlap. FZ conceived and designed the experiments; performed
the analysis and interpreted the results; contributed to writing the manuscript.
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Figure 21: Probability Density Functions (PDFs) of the polarization of Sup-
porters and Denials computed both on likes (left) and on comments (right).
fine the user polarization ρ as the ratio of likes on a specific category with
respect to the user’s total number of likes. The more the value is close to 1
(or−1) the more the user interacts with one of the two narratives. Fig. 21
shows the Probability Density Function of users’ activity on the two cat-
egories. We notice that distributions are sharply bimodal. Users focus on
one kind of narrative and ignore the other one. Information belonging to
the two narratives gets absorbed by different and isolated groups.
The tendency of users to focus on their favorite narratives and form
polarized groups might alter the way in which certain topics are ab-
sorbed. To validate this aspect, we analyze how the subject of a post
is presented to the users. We make use of IBM AlchemyAPI (144) to ex-
tract semantic metadata from posts content. In particular we extract the
sentiment and main concepts discussed within each post of the dataset
whether it has a textual description or a link to an external document.
Fig. 22 shows the sentiment distribution of posts on both Supporters
and Denials pages. We may observe a slightly negative pattern for both
categories, although more pronounced for Denials rather than for Sup-
porters. Notice that we are referring to the way in which subjects are
discussed into the post; we are not taking into account the sentiment that
the post may elicit in the reader, or the sentiment of users involved in the
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Figure 22: Sentiment distribution of posts on Denials and Supporters
pages. The sentiment is defined in the range [−1, 1], where −1 is negative,
0 is neutral, and 1 is positive.
discussion.
To make explicit how the Supporters and Denials echo chambers per-
ceive the different debated issues, we now focus on concepts discussed
by pages of both narratives. Fig. 23 shows all the concepts shared by
posts of both echo chambers. For each concept we compute its average
sentiment i.e., the mean of the sentiment of all the posts where it appears.
Concepts are ordered by taking into account the difference between the
average sentiment on Supporters posts and that on Denials ones. Thus,
concepts at the bottom are discussed in a much more similar way on both
categories, differently from the top.
Our findings show that the discussion is polarized and both echo
chambers express different emotions with respect to the same topics. In
particular, the technique introduced in Fig. 23 could be of great interest to
identify the most controversial topics. Indeed, it is thoroughly likely that
the greater the emotional distance between the same concept in two echo
chambers, the greater the polarization of users involved in the discus-
sion. Therefore, this distance may become a key marker to locate crucial
topics and understand how to deal with them.
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Figure 23: Concepts shared by Supporters and Denials echo chambers.
For each concept we show its average sentiment (computed over all the
posts where it appears). Concepts are ordered by taking into account the
difference between the average sentiment on Supporters posts and that on
Denials ones.
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APPENDIX
A
OTHER WORKS
A.1 The Spreading of Misinformation Online
This section is based on a co-authored paper published on the Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
(PNAS) (73)1.
A.1.1 Main Results and Discussion
The wide availability of user-provided content in online social media
facilitates the aggregation of people around common interests, world-
views, and narratives. However, the World Wide Web is a fruitful en-
vironment for the massive diffusion of unverified rumors. In this work,
using a massive quantitative analysis of Facebook, we show that infor-
mation related to distinct narratives generates homogeneous and polar-
ized communities having similar information consumption patterns.
In particular, we focus on how Facebook users consume information
related to two distinct narratives: scientific and conspiracy news. We
find that, although consumers of scientific and conspiracy stories present
similar consumption patterns with respect to content, cascade dynamics
1FZ contributed to design and perform research; provide analytic tools; analyze data;
write the paper. See (73) for further details.
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Figure 24: Lifetime as a function of the cascade size for conspiracy news
(left) and science news (right). Science news quickly reaches a higher dif-
fusion; a longer lifetime does not correspond to a higher level of interest.
Conspiracy rumors are assimilated more slowly and show a positive rela-
tion between lifetime and size.
differ. Selective exposure to content is the primary driver of content dif-
fusion and generates the formation of echo chambers. Indeed, homogene-
ity appears to be the primary driver for the diffusion of contents and each
echo chamber has its own cascade dynamics.
Fig. 24 shows the lifetime as a function of the cascade size. For sci-
ence news we have a peak in the lifetime corresponding to a cascade
size value of ≈ 200, and higher cascade size values correspond to high
lifetime variability. For conspiracy-related content the lifetime increases
with cascade size. These results suggest that news assimilation differs
according to the categories. Science news is usually assimilated, i.e., it
reaches a higher level of diffusion quickly, and a longer lifetime does not
correspond to a higher level of interest. Conversely, conspiracy rumors
are assimilated more slowly and show a positive relation between life-
time and size. For both science and conspiracy news, we compute the
size as a function of the lifetime and confirm that differentiation in the
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Figure 25: PDF of edge homogeneity for science (orange) and conspiracy
(blue) news. Homogeneity paths are dominant on the whole cascades for
both scientific and conspiracy news.
sharing patterns is content-driven, and that for conspiracy there is a pos-
itive relation between size and lifetime.
We next examine the social determinants that drive sharing patterns
and we focus on the role of homo- geneity in friendship networks. Fig.
25 shows the PDF of the mean-edge homogeneity, computed for all cas-
cades of science news and conspiracy theories. It shows that the majority
of links between consecutively sharing users is homogeneous. In partic-
ular, the average edge homogeneity value of the entire sharing cascade is
always greater than or equal to zero, indicating that either the informa-
tion transmission occurs inside homogeneous clusters in which all links
are homogeneous or it occurs inside mixed neighborhoods in which the
balance between homogeneous and nonhomogeneous links is favorable
toward the former ones. However, the probability of close to zero mean-
edge homogeneity is quite small. Contents tend to circulate only inside
the echo chamber.
Hence, to further characterize the role of homogeneity in shaping
sharing cascades, we compute cascade size as a function of mean-edge
homogeneity for both science and conspiracy news (Fig. 26). In science
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Figure 26: Cascade size as a function of edge homogeneity for science (or-
ange) and conspiracy (blue) news.
news, higher levels of mean-edge homogeneity in the interval (0.5, 0.8)
correspond to larger cascades, but in conspiracy theories lower levels of
mean-edge homogeneity (∼ 0.25) correspond to larger cascades. No-
tice that, although viral patterns related to distinct contents differ, homo-
geneity is clearly the driver of information diffusion.
Our findings show that users mostly tend to select and share content
according to a specific narrative and to ignore the rest. This suggests
that the determinant for the formation of echo chambers is confirmation
bias. To model this mechanism we now introduce a percolation model
of rumor spreading to account for homogeneity and polarization and we
show that homogeneity and polarization are the main determinants for
predicting cascades’ size.
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A.2 Users Polarization on Facebook and You-
Tube
This section is based on a co-authored paper published on PLoS ONE
(145)2.
A.2.1 Main Results and Discussion
Users online tend to select information that support and adhere their
beliefs, and to form polarized groups sharing the same view – e.g. echo
chambers. Algorithms for content promotion may favour this phenomenon,
by accounting for users preferences and thus limiting the exposure to
unsolicited contents. To shade light on this question, we perform a com-
parative study on how same contents (videos) are consumed on different
online social media – i.e. Facebook and YouTube – over a sample of 12M
of users.
We focus on Facebook posts linking Youtube videos reported on Sci-
ence and Conspiracy pages. We then compare the users interaction with
these videos on both platforms. Fig. 27 shows the Probability Density
Functions (PDFs) of about 12M users and on how they distribute their
comments on Science and Conspiracy posts (polarization) on both Face-
book and YouTube. We observe sharply peaked bimodal distributions.
Users concentrate their activity on one of the two narratives. Indeed the
percentage of polarized users is equal to 93.6% on Facebook and 87.8%
on YouTube; therefore, two well separated communities support compet-
ing narratives in both online social networks. Content has a polarizing
effect: users focus on specific types of content and aggregate in separated
groups – echo chambers – independently of the platform and content
promotion algorithm.
We extend our analysis by investigating the polarization dynamics
– i.e., how users become polarized comment after comment. On both
platforms, we observe that some users interact only with a specific kind
2FZ contributed materials and analysis tools; write the paper. See (145) for further de-
tails.
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Figure 27: Polarization on Facebook and YouTube. The PDFs of the polar-
ization ρ show that the vast majority of users is polarized towards one of the
two conflicting narratives – i.e. Science and Conspiracy – on both Facebook
and YouTube.
of content since the beginning, whereas others start their commenting
activity by switching between contents supporting different narratives.
The vast majority of the latter – after the initial switching phase – starts
consuming mainly one type of information, becoming polarized towards
one of the two conflicting narratives.
Our findings show that content drives the emergence of echo cham-
bers on both platforms. Moreover, we show that the users’ commenting
patterns are accurate predictors for the formation of echo chambers.
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A.3 Homophily and Polarization in the Age of
Misinformation
This section is based on a co-authored paper to appear on the European
Physical Journal Special Topics (EPJ ST) in 2016 (146)3. Preliminary re-
sults were also published in the Proceedings of the 24th International
Conference on World Wide Web (72).
A.3.1 Main Results and Discussion
The World Economic Forum listed massive digital misinformation as one
of the main threats for our society. The spreading of unsubstantiated
rumors may have serious consequences on public opinion such as in the
case of rumors about Ebola causing disruption to health-care workers. In
this work we target Facebook to characterize information consumption
patterns of 1.2M Italian users with respect to verified (science news) and
unverified (conspiracy news) contents. Through a thorough quantitative
analysis we provide important insights about the anatomy of the system
across which misinformation might spread. In particular, we show that
users’ engagement on verified (or unverified) content correlates with the
number of friends having similar consumption patterns i.e., homophily.
Fig. 28 shows the linear relationship between the fraction of friends
polarized on the same category of the user and the logarithm of her activ-
ity. Thus, we check whether for a polarized user the fraction of polarized
friends in her category can be predicted by means of a linear regression
model where the explanatory variable is a logarithmic transformation
of the number of likes θ i.e., y = β0 + β1 log(θ). Coefficients are esti-
mated using ordinary least squares and they are –with the correspond-
ing standard errors inside the round brackets– βˆ0 = 0.70 (0.005) and
βˆ1 = 0.043 (0.001), with R2 = 0.95, for users polarized towards science,
and βˆ0 = 0.71 (0.003) and βˆ1 = 0.047 (0.0006), with R2 = 0.98, for users
polarized towards conspiracy.
3FZ contributed materials and analysis tools; wrote the paper. See (72; 146) for further
details.
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Figure 28: Predicting the fraction of friends of users polarized on science
(left) and on conspiracy (right).
Finally, we measure how this social system responded to the injection
of 4, 709 false information. Fig. 29 illustrates the average value of the
polarization, avg(ρ), for increasing levels of shares; more precisely, we
compute the average polarization of all the users who liked troll posts
with a number of shares greater than x. We find an increasing trend that
starts from an average polarization of∼ 0.6 and asymptotically stabilizes
at about ∼ 0.73; the average polarization starts to increase sharply at
x ∼ 20 and saturates at x ∼ 200. Users exposed to conspiracy stories
seem to be more prone to diffuse intentionally false information.
Our findings show that the frequent (and selective) exposure to spe-
cific kind of content (polarization) is a good proxy for the detection of ho-
mophile clusters where certain kind of rumors are more likely to spread.
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Figure 29: Average polarization of users who liked troll posts (intentionally
false information). Notice that the polarization increases with the number
of shares, indicating that very popular posts containing false information
are mostly supported by conspiracy users.
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A.4 Trend of Narratives in the Age of
Misinformation
This section is based on a co-authored paper published on PLoS ONE
(75)4.
A.4.1 Main Results and Discussion
Social media enabled a direct path from producer to consumer of con-
tents changing the way users get informed, debate, and shape their world-
views. Such a disintermediation might weaken consensus on social rele-
vant issues in favor of rumors, mistrust, or conspiracy thinking – e.g.,
chem-trails inducing global warming, the link between vaccines and autism,
or the New World Order conspiracy. Previous studies pointed out that
consumers of conspiracy-like content are likely to aggregate in homophile
clusters – i.e., echo-chambers.
Along this path we study, by means of a thorough quantitative analy-
sis, how different topics are consumed inside the conspiracy echo-chamber
in the Italian Facebook. Through a semi-automatic topic extraction strat-
egy, we show that the most consumed contents semantically refer to four
specific categories: environment, diet, health, and geopolitics. Fig. 30 shows
the backbone of the co-occurrence term network, where different colors
indicate nodes belonging to different conspiracy categories. We find sim-
ilar consumption patterns by comparing users activity (likes and com-
ments) on posts belonging to these different semantic categories.
Finally, we analyze the relationship between the engagement of a user
– i.e. the number of likes she left on conspiracy posts – and how her ac-
tivity is distributed across categories. We model users mobility across the
distinct topics finding that the more a user is active, the more he is likely
to span on all categories. Fig. 31 shows that the more a conspiracy user is
engaged the more his activity spread on the overall corpus. Indeed, once
inside a conspiracy narrative users tend to embrace the overall corpus.
4FZ contributed to perform the experiments, analyze data, provide materials and anal-
ysis tools, write the paper. See (75) for further details.
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Figure 30: Backbone of conspiracy terms co-occurence network. Different
colors indicate nodes belonging to different semantic category according to
the output of the supervised tagging. In particular, purple nodes belong to
geopolitics, red nodes to environment, blue nodes to health, and green to
diet.
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Figure 31: Engagement and mobility across semantic categories. Light
blue lines represent the median of the likes distributions; pale blue shaded
boxes represent the interquartile range (25–75 percentile); horizontal bars
represent the extremes of the distributions. Users active on four categories
are 15, 510; users active on three categories are 20, 929; users active on two
categories are 21, 631; and users active on one category are 9, 980.
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APPENDIX
B
DATASETS
B.1 Science & Conspiracy on the Italian Face-
book
We provide the full list of Facebook pages of our Italian dataset. Table 17
lists scientific pages, while Table 18 lists conspiracy pages.
Table 17: Scientific news sources of the Italian dataset.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 Scientificast.it 129133110517884
2 CICAP 32775139194
3 OggiScienza 106965734432
4 Query 128523133833337
5 Gravita` Zero 138484279514358
6 COELUM Astronomia 81631306737
7 MedBunker 246240278737917
8 In Difesa della Sperimentazione Animale 365212740272738
9 Italia Unita per la Scienza 492924810790346
10 Scienza Live 227175397415634
11 La scienza come non l’avete mai vista 230542647135219
12 LIBERASCIENZA 301266998787
13 Scienze Naturali 134760945225
14 Perche´ vaccino 338627506257240
15 Le Scienze 146489812096483
16 Vera scienza 389493082245
17 Scienza in rete 84645527341
18 Galileo, giornale di scienza e problemi globali 94897729756
19 Scie Chimiche: Informazione Corretta 351626174626
20 Complottismo? No grazie 399888818975
21 INFN - Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare 45086217578
22 Signoraggio: informazione corretta 279217954594
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23 JFK informazione corretta 113204388784459
24 Scetticamente 146529622080908
25 Vivisezione e Sperimentazione Animale, verita` e menzogne 548684548518541
26 Medici Senza Frontiere 65737832194
27 Task Force Pandora 273189619499850
28 VaccinarSI 148150648573922
29 Lega Nerd 165086498710
30 Super Quark 47601641660
31 Curiosita` Scientifiche 595492993822831
32 Minerva - Associazione di Divulgazione Scientifica 161460900714958
33 Pro-Test Italia 221292424664911
34 Uniti per la Ricerca 132734716745038
Table 18: Conspiracy news sources of the Italian dataset.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 Scienza di Confine 188189217954979
2 CSSC - Cieli Senza Scie Chimiche 253520844711659
3 STOP ALLE SCIE CHIMICHE 199277020680
4 Vaccini Basta 233426770069342
5 Tanker Enemy 444154468988487
6 SCIE CHIMICHE 68091825232
7 MES Dittatore Europeo 194120424046954
8 Lo sai 126393880733870
9 AmbienteBio 109383485816534
10 Eco(R)esistenza 203737476337348
11 curarsialnaturale 159590407439801
12 La Resistenza 256612957830788
13 Radical Bio 124489267724876
14 Fuori da Matrix 123944574364433
15 Graviola Italia 130541730433071
16 Signoraggio.it 278440415537619
17 Informare Per Resistere 101748583911
18 Sul Nuovo Ordine Mondiale 340262489362734
19 Avvistamenti e Contatti 352513104826417
20 Umani in Divenire 195235103879949
21 Nikola Tesla - il SEGRETO 108255081924
22 Teletrasporto 100774912863
23 PNL e Ipnosi 150500394993159
24 HAARP - controllo climatico 117166361628599
25 Sezione Aurea, Studio di Energia Vibrazionale 113640815379825
26 PER UNA NUOVA MEDICINA 113933508706361
27 PSICOALIMENTARSI E CURARSI NATURALMENTE 119866258041409
28 La nostra ignoranza la LORO forza. 520400687983468
29 HIV non causa AIDS 121365461259470
30 Sapere un Dovere 444729718909881
31 V per Verita` 223425924337104
32 Genitori veg 211328765641743
33 Operatori di luce 195636673927835
34 Coscienza Nuova 292747470828855
35 Aprite Gli Occhi 145389958854351
36 Neovitruvian 128660840526907
37 CoscienzaSveglia 158362357555710
38 Medicinenon 248246118546060
39 TERRA REAL TIME 208776375809817
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B.2 Science & Conspiracy on the US Facebook
We provide the full list of Facebook pages of our US dataset. Table 19
lists conspiracy pages, while Table 20 lists scientific pages, and Table 21
lists debunking pages.
Table 19: Conspiracy news sources of the US dataset.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 Spirit Science and Metaphysics 171274739679432
2 Spirit Science 210238862349944
3 The Conspiracy Archives 262849270399655
4 iReleaseEndorphins 297719273575542
5 World of Lucid Dreaming 98584674825
6 The Science of Spirit 345684712212932
7 Esoteric Philosophy 141347145919527
8 9/11 Truth Movement 259930617384687
9 Great Health The Natural Way 177320665694370
10 New World Order News 111156025645268
11 Freedom Isn’t Free on FB 634692139880441
12 Skeptic Society 224391964369022
13 The Spiritualist 197053767098051
14 Anonymous World Wide 494931210527903
15 The Life Beyond Earth 152806824765696
16 Illuminati Exposed 298088266957281
17 Illuminating Souls 38466722555
18 Alternative Way 119695318182956
19 Paranormal Conspiracies 455572884515474
20 CANNABIS CURES CANCERS! 115759665126597
21 Natural Cures Not Medicine 1104995126306864
22 CTA Conspiracy Theorists’ Association 515416211855967
23 Illuminati Killers 478715722175123
24 Conspiracy 2012 & Beyond 116676015097888
25 GMO Dangers 182443691771352
26 The Truthers Awareness 576279865724651
27 Exposing the truth about America 385979414829070
28 Occupy Bilderberg 231170273608124
29 Speak the Revolution 422518854486140
30 I Don’t Trust The Government 380911408658563
31 Sky Watch Map 417198734990619
32 | truthaholics 201546203216539
33 UFO Phenomenon 419069998168962
34 Conspiracy Theories & The Illuminati 117611941738491
35 Lets Change The World 625843777452057
36 Makaveli The Prince Killuminati 827000284010733
37 It’s A New Day 116492031738006
38 New world outlawz - killuminati soldiers 422048874529740
39 The Government’s bullshit. Your argument is invalid. 173884216111509
40 America Awakened 620954014584248
41 The truth behold 466578896732948
42 Alien Ufo And News 334372653327841
43 Anti-Bilderberg Resistance Movement 161284443959494
44 The Truth Unleashed 431558836898020
45 Anti GMO Foods and Fluoride Water 366658260094302
46 STOP Controlling Nature 168168276654316
47 9/11 Blogger 109918092364301
79
48 9/11 Studies and Outreach Club at ASU 507983502576368
49 9/11 Truth News 120603014657906
50 Abolish the FDA 198124706875206
51 AboveTopSecret.com 141621602544762
52 Activist Post 128407570539436
53 Alliance for Natural Health USA 243777274534
54 All Natural & Organic. Say No To Toxic Chemicals. 323383287739269
55 Alternative Medicine 219403238093061
56 Alternative World News Network 154779684564904
57 AltHealthWORKS 318639724882355
58 American Academy of Environmental Medicine 61115567111
59 American Association of Naturopathic Physicians 14848224715
60 Ancient Alien Theory 147986808591048
61 Ancient Aliens 100140296694563
62 Ancient Astronaut Theory 73808938369
63 The Anti-Media 156720204453023
64 Anti Sodium Fluoride Movement 143932698972116
65 Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth 59185411268
66 Association of Accredited Naturopathic Medical Colleges (AANMC) 60708531146
67 Autism Media Channel 129733027101435
68 Babes Against Biotech 327002374043204
69 Bawell Alkaline Water Ionizer Health Benefits 447465781968559
70 CancerTruth 348939748204
71 Chemtrails Awareness 12282631069
72 Collective Evolution 131929868907
73 Conspiracy Theory With Jesse Ventura 122021024620821
74 The Daily Sheeple 114637491995485
75 Dr. Bronner’s Magic Soaps 33699882778
76 Dr. Joseph Mercola 114205065589
77 Dr. Ronald Hoffman 110231295707464
78 Earth. We are one. 149658285050501
79 Educate Inspire Change 467083626712253
80 Energise for Life: The Alkaline Diet Experts! 99263884780
81 Exposing The Truth 175868780941
82 The Farmacy 482134055140366
83 Fluoride Action Network 109230302473419
84 Food Babe 132535093447877
85 Global Research (Centre for Research on Globalization) 200870816591393
86 GMO Inside 478981558808326
87 GMO Just Say No 1390244744536466
88 GreenMedInfo.com 111877548489
89 Healthy Holistic Living 134953239880777
90 I Fucking Love Truth 445723122122920
91 InfoWars 80256732576
92 Institute for Responsible Technology 355853721234
93 I Want To Be 100% Organic 431825520263804
94 Knowledge of Today 307551552600363
95 La Healthy Living 251131238330504
96 March Against Monsanto 566004240084767
97 Millions Against Monsanto by OrganicConsumers.org 289934516904
98 The Mind Unleashed 432632306793920
99 Moms Across America 111116155721597
100 Moms for Clean Air/Stop Jet Aerosol Spraying 1550135768532988
101 Natural Society 191822234195749
102 Non-GMO Project 55972693514
103 Occupy Corporatism 227213404014035
104 The Open Mind 782036978473504
105 Organic Consumers Association 13341879933
106 Organic Health 637019016358534
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107 The Organic Prepper 435427356522981
108 PreventDisease.com 199701427498
109 Raw For Beauty 280583218719915
110 REALfarmacy.com 457765807639814
111 ReThink911 581078305246370
112 Sacred Geometry and Ancient Knowledge 363116270489862
113 Stop OC Smart Meters 164620026961366
114 The Top Information Post 505941169465529
115 The Truth About Vaccines 133579170019140
116 Truth Teller 278837732170258
117 Veterans Today 170917822620
118 What Doctors Don’t Tell You 157620297591924
119 Wheat Belly 209766919069873
120 Why don’t you try this? 202719226544269
121 WND 119984188013847
122 WorldTruth.TV 114896831960040
123 Zeitgeist 32985985640
124 Ancient Origins 530869733620642
125 Astrology Answers 413145432131383
126 Astrology News Service 196416677051124
127 Autism Action Network 162315170489749
128 Awakening America 406363186091465
129 Awakening People 204136819599624
130 Cannabinoids Cure Diseases & The Endocannabinoid System Makes It Possible. 322971327723145
131 Celestial Healing Wellness Center 123165847709982
132 Chico Sky Watch 149772398420200
133 A Conscious awakening 539906446080416
134 Conspiracy Syndrome 138267619575029
135 Conspiracy Theory: Truth Hidden in Plain Sight, and Army of SATAN 124113537743088
136 Cosmic Intelligence-Agency 164324963624932
137 C4ST 371347602949295
138 Deepak Chopra 184133190664
139 Dr. Mehmet Oz 35541499994
140 Earth Patriot 373323356902
141 Electromagnetic Radiation Safety 465980443450930
142 EMF Safety Network 199793306742863
143 End Time Headlines 135010313189665
144 Young Living Essential Oils 29796911981
145 Exposing Bilderberg 2012 300498383360728
146 Exposing The Illuminati 196087297165394
147 Exposing Satanic World Government 529736240478567
148 FEMA Camps Exposed 285257418255898
149 Fight Against Illuminati And New World Order 195559810501401
150 FitLife.tv 148518475178805
151 GMO Free USA 402058139834655
152 Holistic Health 105497186147476
153 The Illuminati 543854275628660
154 Illuminati Mind Control 499866223357022
155 Intelwars 130166550361356
156 Natural Solutions Foundation 234136166735798
157 NWO Truth Radio 135090269995781
158 Occupy Bilderberg 2012 227692450670795
159 Operation: Awakening- The Global Revolution 287772794657070
160 The Paradigm Shift 221341527884801
161 PositiveMed 177648308949017
162 Press TV 145097112198751
163 The Resistance 394604877344757
164 Rima E. Laibow, M.D. - Save My Life Dr. Rima 107527312740569
165 RT America 137767151365
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166 Ruble’s Wonderings - Forbidden Archeology & Science 265422293590870
167 Seekers Of Truth 736499966368634
168 Spiritual Ecology 261982733906722
169 Spiritualer.com 531950866874307
170 Take Back Your Power 269179579827247
171 There is a cure for Cancer, but it is not FDA approved. Phoenix Tears work! 395190597537
172 True Activist 129370207168068
173 Truth Exposed Radio 173823575962481
174 Truth Movement 161389033958012
175 Truth Network 271701606246002
176 Wake up call 276404442375280
177 We Should Ban GMOs 516524895097781
178 vactruth.com 287991907988
179 Veterans Today Truth Warriors 645478795537771
180 4 Foot Farm Blueprint 1377091479178258
181 Dawning Golden Crystal Age 127815003927694
182 Occupy Your Mind 393849780700637
183 We do not Forgive. We do not Forget. We are Anonymous. Expect Us. 134030470016833
184 Health Impact News 469121526459635
185 NaturalNews.com 35590531315
186 World for 9/11 Truth 38411749990
187 Beware of Disinformation 558882824140805
188 Citizens For Legitimate Government 93486533659
189 Cureyourowncancer.org 535679936458252
190 Juicing Vegetables 172567162798498
191 Quantum Prophecies 323520924404870
192 AIM Integrative Medicine 137141869763519
193 Autism Nutrition Research Center 1508552969368252
194 The Canary Party 220071664686886
195 Chemtrail Research 247681531931261
196 Chemtrail Watchers 77065926441
197 Children’s Medical Safety Research Institute 790296257666848
198 Contaminated Vaccines 686182981422650
199 Dane Wigington 680418385353616
200 David Icke 147823328841
201 David Icke Books Limited 191364871070270
202 David Icke - Headlines 1421025651509652
203 Disinformation Directory 258624097663749
204 The Drs. Wolfson 1428115297409777
205 Educate, Inspire & Change. The Truth Is Out There, Just Open Your Eyes 111415972358133
206 Focus for Health Foundation 456051981200997
207 Generation Rescue 162566388038
208 Geoengineering Watch 448281071877305
209 Global Skywatch 128141750715760
210 The Greater Good 145865008809119
211 The Health Freedom Express 450411098403289
212 Homegrown Health 190048467776279
213 Intellihub 439119036166643
214 The Liberty Beacon 222092971257181
215 International Medical Council on Vaccination 121591387888250
216 International Medical Council on Vaccination - Maine Chapter 149150225097217
217 Medical Jane 156904131109730
218 Mississippi Parents for Vaccine Rights 141170989357307
219 My parents didn’t put me in time-out, they whooped my ass! 275738084532
220 National Vaccine Information Center 143745137930
221 The Raw Feed Live 441287025913792
222 Rinf.com 154434341237962
223 SANEVAX 139881632707155
224 Things pro-vaxers say 770620782980490
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225 Unvaccinated America 384030984975351
226 Vaccine Injury Law Project 295977950440133
227 Vermont Coalition for Vaccine Choice 380959335251497
228 9/11: The BIGGEST LIE 129496843915554
229 Agent Orange Activists 644062532320637
230 Age of Autism 183383325034032
231 AutismOne 199957646696501
232 Awakened Citizen 481936318539426
233 Best Chinese Medicines 153901834710826
234 Black Salve 224002417695782
235 Bought Movie 144198595771434
236 Children Of Vietnam Veterans Health Alliance 222449644516926
237 Collective-Evolution Shift 277160669144420
238 Doctors Are Dangerous 292077004229528
239 Dr. Tenpenny on Vaccines 171964245890
240 Dr Wakefield’s work must continue 84956903164
241 EndoRIOT 168746323267370
242 Enenews 126572280756448
243 Expanded Consciousness 372843136091545
244 Exposing the truths of the Illuminati II 157896884221277
245 Family Health Freedom Network 157276081149274
246 Fearless Parent 327609184049041
247 Food Integrity Now 336641393949
248 Four Winds 10 233310423466959
249 Fukushima Explosion What You Do Not Know 1448402432051510
250 The Golden Secrets 250112083847
251 Health Without Medicine & Food Without Chemicals 304937512905083
252 Higher Perspective 488353241197000
253 livingmaxwell 109584749954
254 JFK Truth 1426437510917392
255 New World Order Library | NWO Library 194994541179
256 No Fluoride 117837414684
257 Open Minds Magazine 139382669461984
258 Organic Seed Alliance 111220277149
259 Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association 124679267607065
260 RadChick Radiation Research & Mitigation 260610960640885
261 The REAL Institute - Max Bliss 328240720622120
262 Realities Watch 647751428644641
263 StormCloudsGathering 152920038142341
264 Tenpenny Integrative Medical Centers (TIMC) 144578885593545
265 Vaccine Epidemic 190754844273581
266 VaccineImpact 783513531728629
267 Weston A. Price Foundation 58956225915
268 What On Earth Is Happening 735263086566914
269 The World According to Monsanto 70550557294
270 Truth Theory 175719755481
271 Csglobe 403588786403016
272 Free Energy Truth 192446108025
273 Smart Meter Education Network 630418936987737
274 The Mountain Astrologer magazine 112278112664
275 Alberta Chemtrail Crusaders 1453419071541217
276 Alkaline Us 430099307105773
277 Americas Freedom Fighters 568982666502934
278 Anti-Masonic Party Founded 1828 610426282420191
279 Cannabidiol OIL 241449942632203
280 Cancer Compass˜An Alternate Route 464410856902927
281 Collective Evolution Lifestyle 1412660665693795
282 Conscious Life News 148270801883880
283 Disclosure Project 112617022158085
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284 Dr. Russell Blaylock, MD 123113281055091
285 Dumbing Down People into Sheeple 123846131099156
286 Expand Your Consciousness 351484988331613
287 Fluoride: Poison on Tap 1391282847818928
288 Gaiam TV 182073298490036
289 Gary Null & Associates 141821219197583
290 Genesis II Church of Health & Healing (Official) 115744595234934
291 Genetic Crimes Unit 286464338091839
292 Global Healing Center 49262013645
293 Gluten Free Society 156656676820
294 GMO Free Oregon 352284908147199
295 GMO Journal 113999915313056
296 GMO OMG 525732617477488
297 GreenMedTV 1441106586124552
298 Healing The Symptoms Known As Autism 475607685847989
299 Health Conspiracy Radio 225749987558859
300 Health and Happiness 463582507091863
301 Jesse Ventura 138233432870955
302 Jim Humble 252310611483446
303 Kid Against Chemo 742946279111241
304 Kids Right To Know Club 622586431101931
305 The Master Mineral Solution of the 3rd Millennium 527697750598681
306 Millions Against Monsanto Maui 278949835538988
307 Millions Against Monsanto World Food Day 2011 116087401827626
308 Newsmax Health 139852149523097
309 Non GMO journal 303024523153829
310 Nurses Against ALL Vaccines 751472191586573
311 Oath Keepers 182483688451972
312 Oath Keepers of America 1476304325928788
313 The Organic & Non-GMO Report 98397470347
314 Oregon Coast Holographic Skies Informants 185456364957528
315 Paranormal Research Project 1408287352721685
316 Politically incorrect America 340862132747401
317 (Pure Energy Systems) PES Network, Inc. 183247495049420
318 Save Hawaii from Monsanto 486359274757546
319 Sayer Ji 205672406261058
320 SecretSpaceProgram 126070004103888
321 SPM Southern Patriots MIlitia 284567008366903
322 Thrive 204987926185574
323 Truth Connections 717024228355607
324 Truth Frequency 396012345346
325 Truthstream Media.com 193175867500745
326 VT Right To Know GMOs 259010264170581
327 We Are Change 86518833689
328 Wisdom Tribe 7 Walking in Wisdom. 625899837467523
329 World Association for Vaccine Education 1485654141655627
330 X Tribune 1516605761946273
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Table 20: Scientific news sources of the US dataset.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 AAAS - The American Association for the Advancement of Science 19192438096
2 AAAS Dialogue on Science, Ethics and Religion 183292605082365
3 Armed with Science 228662449288
4 AsapSCIENCE 162558843875154
5 Bridge to Science 185160951530768
6 EurekAlert! 178218971326
7 Food Science 165396023578703
8 Food Science and Nutrition 117931493622
9 I fucking love science 367116489976035
10 LiveScience 30478646760
11 Medical Laboratory Science 122670427760880
12 National Geographic Magazine 72996268335
13 National Science Foundation (NSF) 30037047899
14 Nature 6115848166
15 Nature Education 109424643283
16 Nature Reviews 328116510545096
17 News from Science 100864590107
18 Popular Science 60342206410
19 RealClearScience 122453341144402
20 Science 96191425588
21 Science and Mathematics 149102251852371
22 Science Channel 14391502916
23 Science Friday 10862798402
24 Science News Magazine 35695491869
25 Science-Based Medicine 354768227983392
26 Science-fact 167184886633926
27 Science, Critical Thinking and Skepticism 274760745963769
28 Science: The Magic of Reality 253023781481792
29 ScienceDaily 60510727180
30 ScienceDump 111815475513565
31 ScienceInsider 160971773939586
32 Scientific American magazine 22297920245
33 Scientific Reports 143076299093134
34 Sense About Science 182689751780179
35 Skeptical Science 317015763334
36 The Beauty of Science & Reality. 215021375271374
37 The Flame Challenge 299969013403575
38 The New York Times - Science 105307012882667
39 Wired Science 6607338526
40 All Science, All the Time 247817072005099
41 Life’s Little Mysteries 373856446287
42 Reason Magazine 17548474116
43 Nature News and Comment 139267936143724
44 Astronomy Magazine 108218329601
45 CERN 169005736520113
46 Citizen Science 200725956684695
47 Cosmos 143870639031920
48 Discover Magazine 9045517075
49 Discovery News 107124643386
50 Genetics and Genomics 459858430718215
51 Genetic Research Group 193134710731208
52 Medical Daily 189874081082249
53 MIT Technology Review 17043549797
54 NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration 54971236771
55 New Scientist 235877164588
56 Science Babe 492861780850602
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57 ScienceBlogs 256321580087
58 Science, History, Exploration 174143646109353
59 Science News for Students 136673493023607
60 The Skeptics Society & Skeptic Magazine 23479859352
61 Compound Interest 1426695400897512
62 Kevin M. Folta 712124122199236
63 Southern Fried Science 411969035092
64 ThatsNonsense.com 107149055980624
65 Science & Reason 159797170698491
66 ScienceAlert 7557552517
67 Discovery 6002238585
68 Critical Thinker Academy 175658485789832
69 Critical Thinking and Logic Courses in US Core Public School Curriculum 171842589538247
70 Cultural Cognition Project 287319338042474
71 Foundation for Critical Thinking 56761578230
72 Immunization Action Coalition 456742707709399
73 James Randi Educational Foundation 340406508527
74 NCSE: The National Center for Science Education 185362080579
75 Neil deGrasse Tyson 7720276612
76 Science, Mother Fucker. Science 228620660672248
77 The Immunization Partnership 218891728752
78 Farm Babe 1491945694421203
79 Phys.org 47849178041
80 Technology Org 218038858333420
81 Biology Fortified, Inc. 179017932138240
82 The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania 123413357705549
83 Best Food Facts 200562936624790
Table 21: Debunking news sources of the US dataset.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 Refutations to Anti-Vaccine Memes 414643305272351
2 Boycott Organic 1415898565330025
3 Contrails and Chemtrails:The truth behind the myth 391450627601206
4 Contrail Science 339553572770902
5 Contrail Science and Facts - Stop the Fear Campaign 344100572354341
6 Debunking Denialism 321539551292979
7 The Farmer’s Daughter 350270581699871
8 GMO Answers 477352609019085
9 The Hawaii Farmer’s Daughter 660617173949316
10 People for factual GMO truths (pro-GMO) 255945427857439
11 The Questionist 415335941857289
12 Scientific skepticism 570668942967053
13 The Skeptic’s Dictionary 195265446870
14 Stop the Anti-Science Movement 1402181230021857
15 The Thinking Person’s Guide to Autism 119870308054305
16 Antiviral 326412844183079
17 Center for Inquiry 5945034772
18 The Committee for Skeptical Inquiry 50659619036
19 Doubtful News 283777734966177
20 Hoax-Slayer 69502133435
21 I fucking hate pseudoscience 163735987107605
22 The Genetic Literacy Project 126936247426054
23 Making Sense of Fluoride 549091551795860
24 Metabunk 178975622126946
25 Point of Inquiry 32152655601
26 Quackwatch 220319368131898
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27 Rationalwiki 226614404019306
28 Science-Based Pharmacy 141250142707983
29 Skeptical Inquirer 55675557620
30 Skeptic North 141205274247
31 The Skeptics’ Guide to the Universe 16599501604
32 Society for Science-Based Medicine 552269441534959
33 Things anti-vaxers say 656716804343725
34 This Week in Pseudoscience 485501288225656
35 Violent metaphors 537355189645145
36 wafflesatnoon.com 155026824528163
37 We Love GMOs and Vaccines 1380693538867364
38 California Immunization Coalition 273110136291
39 Exposing PseudoAstronomy 218172464933868
40 CSICOP 157877444419
41 The Panic Virus 102263206510736
42 The Quackometer 331993286821644
43 Phil Plait 251070648641
44 Science For The Open Minded 274363899399265
45 Skeptic’s Toolbox 142131352492158
46 Vaccine Nation 1453445781556645
47 Vaximom 340286212731675
48 Voices for Vaccines 279714615481820
49 Big Organic 652647568145937
50 Chemtrails are NOT real, idiots are. 235745389878867
51 Sluts for Monsanto 326598190839084
52 Stop Homeopathy Plus 182042075247396
53 They Blinded Me with Pseudoscience 791793554212187
54 Pro-Vaccine Shills for Big Pharma, the Illumanati, Reptilians, and the NWO 709431502441281
55 Pilots explain Contrails - and the Chemtrail Hoax 367930929968504
56 The Skeptical Beard 325381847652490
57 The Alliance For Food and Farming 401665083177817
58 Skeptical Raptor 522616064482036
59 Anti-Anti-Vaccine Campaign 334891353257708
60 Informed Citizens Against Vaccination Misinformation 144023769075631
61 Museum of Scientifically Proven Supernatural and Paranormal Phenomena 221030544679341
62 Emergent 375919272559739
63 Green State TV 128813933807183
64 Kavin Senapathy 1488134174787224
65 vactruth.com Exposed 1526700274269631
66 snopes.com 241061082705085
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B.3 Climate Change on Facebook
We provide the full list of pages of our Facebook dataset about climate
change. Table 22 lists pages of denying/questioning climate change and
science, while Table 23 lists pages supporting/promoting climate sci-
ence.
Table 22: Pages supporting anthropogenic global warming.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 Climate Central 57984115023
2 Climate Change For Dummies 253660441493203
3 Climate Change Guide 209071469166691
4 Denial101x 671468936283032
5 Global Warming Fact of the Day 239542442866980
6 I Heart Climate Scientists 332593866775047
7 IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 165091923539860
8 NASA Climate Change 353034908075
9 NPS Climate Change Response 527593347362646
10 RealClearScience 122453341144402
11 ScienceAlert 7557552517
12 Skeptical Science 317015763334
13 The Skeptics’ Guide to the Universe 16599501604
14 Society of Environmental Journalists 433086126732239
15 World Meteorological Organization 71741701887
16 American Meteorological Society 74679966771
17 ARC Centre of Excellence for Climate System Science 197303993749021
18 Ask a Climate Scientist 282058025204543
19 AtmosNews - NCAR UCAR - Atmospheric & Earth System Science 78148787037
20 Climate Change Facts 87694967110
21 Climate Change and the Pacific Islands 975669532452905
22 Climate Change Policy & Practice 192140072102
23 The Climate Denial Crock of the Week 270080745702
24 Climate Reality 153278754738777
25 Climate Speakers Network 579252922169321
26 COP21 1514890778722700
27 European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists EAERE 113938735290092
28 Global Sustainability Foundation 303269799822796
29 I Heart Climate Scientists 332593866775047
30 InsideClimate News 245371732167183
31 International Institute for Environment and Development IIED 111963037878
32 International Institute for Sustainable Development IISD 72656094247
33 International Organization for Migration - Micronesia 138751482902381
34 Monash Simple Climate Model 1213399748677520
35 NCAR Computational and Information Systems Laboratory 1491699071092530
36 NCSE: The National Center for Science Education 185362080579
37 Northwest Climate Science Center 1417878408476380
38 PAST Lab 170667903076996
39 School of Integrated Climate System Sciences SICSS 121603291211738
40 ScienceAlert 7557552517
41 South-Central Climate Science Center 237652062962951
42 Southern Climate Impacts Planning Program 119105441532461
43 Southern Fried Science 411969035092
44 Springer Climate 278122429054474
45 Sustainable Development Policy & Practice / Post-2015 Development Agenda 126385310775420
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46 UCARConnect 362743340521245
47 Uwapei Global Warming Campaign 1614051862144030
48 World Climate Research Programme 222477407818862
49 Agenda21.it 235726426493102
50 Bureau of Meteorology 170992086298033
51 Center for Climate Change Communication 359055448297
52 CleanTechnica 154039257947286
53 Citizens’ Climate Lobby 3rd Coast Region 388244997921404
54 Climate Frontlines 206138405843
55 Climate Progress 187005858017014
56 CSIRO 142468583842
57 Environmental Science & Policy at Taylor & Francis 161789877175634
58 Five-Feet.org 464387463731327
59 Global Warming Climate Change Report 96279696758
60 The GLOBE Program 233891673345693
61 Katharine Hayhoe 1463215773903300
62 Michael E. Mann 221222081267335
63 National Climate Assessment 271900656322465
64 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA 201357451715
65 National Renewable Energy Laboratory 73775159896
66 National Science Foundation NSF 30037047899
67 Nature Climate Change 133045436728938
68 NOAA Climate.Gov 320631784698200
69 NOAA Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory 154479014611347
70 NOAA Libraries 132665076873047
71 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information - Climate 348738721824427
72 NOAA Satellite and Information Service 226849284022023
73 NOAA Science On a Sphere 252976835082
74 U.S. Global Change Research Program 143460545677845
75 USGS News: Climate Change 206340569511295
76 What to Do about Climate Change 155811667893723
Table 23: Pages denying anthropogenic global warming.
Page Name Facebook ID
1 American Thinker 144317282271701
2 Australian Climate Madness 117005835006924
3 Breitbart 95475020353
4 Carbon Dioxide 64162630683
5 Carbon Tax! Whats Next? 154174501315763
6 Center for Industrial Progress 215077831880321
7 CFACT 140379955280
8 Climate Change Fraud 322696661147
9 Climate Change Hoax 169840503192972
10 Climate change is natural 313827422002524
11 Climate Change LIES 152483204848827
12 Climategate 226309168331
13 ClimateRealists.com 54260521733
14 Climate Depot 149314838564139
15 Climate-Gate 186103788219
16 Climate Hustle 1088950287806110
17 Climate News 306212519483530
18 Conservative Tribune 519305544814653
19 Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation 12326763660
20 The Daily Caller 182919686769
21 David Icke 147823328841
22 Expose Agenda 21 239480352758933
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23 The Federalist 157843634416312
24 The Federalist Papers 107705785934333
25 Friends of Science 244675788944611
26 The Galileo Movement 101728306584541
27 Global Warming a Scam? 10150111201315300
28 Global Warming Climate Change Hoaxers 942367752456567
29 Heartland Institute 16775672689
30 Human Events 212436860202
31 InfoWars 80256732576
32 The John Birch Society 196291400410701
33 Knowledge Replaces Fear and Ignorance 409494392454244
34 Left Exposed 634007473381128
35 Moonbattery 150964594926416
36 NaturalNews.com 35590531315
37 The New American Magazine 146909368666979
38 NGP-Next Gen Patriots 248737065182352
39 No Frakking Consensus 112150972159981
40 Oil Sands Action 590117937780756
41 Principia Scientific International 223487287746649
42 Renewables Versus Fossil Fuels Facts and Myths 1561787114111510
43 The Revolution 142868065759441
44 Steven Crowder 15139936162
45 We Know The Secrets of The Federal Reserve 178303555571465
46 wattsupwiththat Anthony Watts 133662869999306
47 WND formerly WorldNetDaily 119984188013847
48 World Around Us - Victoria 1612317212341320
49 You Might be a Conservative 131401483600716
50 100 Percent FED Up 311190048935167
51 4timesayear 360297500785985
52 CO2 is not a pollutant 140149506100162
53 Agenda 21 Exposed 150975061627200
54 AgEnders NJ - Agenda 21 Enders of New Jersey 126990307392585
55 AgEnders OK - Agenda 21 Enders of Oklahoma 296069487166798
56 Agenders Tennessee 213562718663812
57 Axed: The End of Green 488280944530354
58 Blue Beats Green 231287880367215
59 Climate change.the conspiracy theory. 249511709222
60 Climate Hustle 1088950287806110
61 Crying Wolf Documentary 209426629082
62 The Liberty Beacon 222092971257181
63 Lord Christopher Monckton 3rd Viscount Monckton of Brenchley 167541331466
64 Moms Against Agenda 21 243717865657674
65 Ohio Agenda 21 Watch 181003108643120
66 Stop Agenda 21 in TN 457433564301109
67 Stop Agenda 21- Washington State 253570204742793
68 Stop UN Agenda 21! Stop ICLEI! 284021125057
69 Climate of Corruption: Politics and Power Behind the Global Warming Hoax 201761106537309
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